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1Introduction
This thesis explores the macroeconomic implications of micro-level frictions. In chap-
ter 2 we explore whether persistent productivity differences at the micro-level should
be understood as a result of a friction in technology choice, and quantifies the effi-
ciency losses in the economy. In chapter 3 we empirically assess through which chan-
nels - factor adjustment costs, price rigidities, or financial frictions - do uncertainty
shocks affect the aggregate economy. Finally, in chapter 4 we quantify trends in labor
income risk and study its implications for welfare and inequality in the context of a
model where workers face search frictions to find jobs. The remainder paragraphs
from the introduction preview the contribution from each chapter in some more de-
tail.
Chapter 2. In this chapter we use plant and firm-level data from Chile, Colombia,
Germany and Indonesia to decompose labor and capital productivity into a persistent
and a transitory component. We find that most of the dispersion in factor produc-
tivities is explained by their persistent component, and related to highly persistent
differences in the capital-labor ratio.
We show that our empirical findings cannot be explained by factor adjustment
frictions, while they are in line with the empirical implications from frictional tech-
nology choice. A setup where firms operate a technology which they adjust only
occasionally, and in between adjustments, production technology - capital intensity -
is Leontief.
We use this framework to quantify the aggregate productivity losses from a fric-
tion in technology choice. The efficiency losses are determined by the elasticity of
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substitution between production factors and the cross-sectional variance of capital
intensity. Despite the large heterogeneity in micro-level capital intensity, the effi-
ciency losses are low compared to the literature. The estimated elasticity of substitu-
tion plays an important role for our results. In our setting, aggregate capital inten-
sity does not fully accommodate to price movements due to a friction in technology
choice. Once we account for this underreaction, we obtain an above one elasticity of
substitution, which reduces substantially the resulting efficiency losses.
Chapter 3. We show that the response of aggregate job flows from uncertainty
shocks depends whether establishments face factor adjustment frictions, price rigidi-
ties, or financial frictions.
Making use of these implications, we estimate the effect of uncertainty shocks
on industry-level job flows in the United States. An unexpected increase in uncer-
tainty implies more jobs destroyed and less jobs created for more than 80% of the
industries. This finding suggests that plants do not freeze employment adjustments
given uncertainty shocks. Further, we relate the cumulative responses on variables
reflecting industry-specific factor adjustment frictions, price rigidities, and financial
frictions. We do not find evidence of factor adjustment frictions nor price rigidities as
channels by which uncertainty affects job flows. On the contrary, financial frictions
surges as an important mechanism.
Chapter 4. The last chapter of this thesis focuses on workers’ heterogeneity. We
explore the evolution of labor market income risk over the last three decades in the
United States. We distinguish between risk resulting from idiosyncratic shocks to a
worker’s productivity, and the risk arising from jobs paying heterogeneous wages
for the same worker. In order to identify these components empirically, we explicitly
model workers’ endogenous responses to these shocks.
Using panel data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)
for males over the period 1983-2013, we find that differentiating between different
types of risk and accounting for selection is important. While the variance of perma-
nent risk has increased, on average, 40% across education groups, heterogeneity in
job offers increased only for workers with at least some college education.
Finally, we quantify the role that changes in risk play in explaining rising wage
inequality and their consequences for social welfare. We develop a structural par-
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tial equilibrium model where workers’ productivity evolves stochastically, and face
search frictions for finding jobs which pay heterogeneous wages for a given pro-
ductivity level. The government and workers’ precautionary savings provide partial
insurance against income uncertainty. When simulating the increase in estimated
risk, the model can account for almost all the rise in wage inequality during the last
three decades. Yet, the overall welfare costs of rising wage uncertainty are small rel-
ative to the literature. Two main factors are important for this result. First, workers
with higher educational degree compensate an increase of permanent risk with more
dispersed job offers, which creates an option value to the worker. Second, the gov-
ernment plays a crucial role in insuring low educated workers. Welfare losses from
changing wage risk would be about five times larger at these workers if government
insurance would not be present.
4 | 1 Introduction
2Productivity Dispersions: Could it Simply
be Technology Choice?
Joint with Christian Bayer and Matthias Meier
2.1 Introduction
The allocation of factors to their most productive use is often seen as one of the key
determinants of economic prosperity (Foster et al., 2008). While first-best efficiency
requires that factors produce the same marginal revenue across all production units,
many studies show this condition to be violated in micro-data: factor productivities
differ substantially within industries.¹
We ask whether these micro-level differences can be understood as a result of
frictions in technology choice; a setup, where firms may in principle choose from a
broad set of technologies, but it is costly to search for them, to install them, and to
acquire the know-how necessary to use them. This leads firms to operate one single
technology which they adjust only occasionally. In between adjustments, production
technology is Leontief. In particular, the capital-labor ratio, the capital intensity, re-
mains fixed. As the economic environment changes and firms asynchronously adapt
their technology in response, cross-sectional differences in factor productivities and
capital intensity emerge.
¹ See Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Peters (2013), Asker et al. (2014),
Gopinath et al. (2015), and Restuccia and Santaeulalia-Llopis (2015) to name a few.
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This, however, is not the only empirical implication of frictional technology choice.
Across all firms, differences in factor productivities and capital intensity should be
predominantly long-lived. Moreover, there must be a trade-off involved. Firms with
persistently high productivity in one factor should have a persistently low produc-
tivity in another factor. Further, as long as capital intensity is fixed, i.e. in the short
run, labor and capital productivity can only move in the same direction. Finally, the
extent of competition limits the scope of technologies used in the economy. The more
competitive the environment, the larger is the pressure to abandon particularly cost-
inefficient technologies.
To explore whether these implications are borne out empirically, we compute
micro-level labor and capital productivity controlling for industry and time effects,
and decompose them into their persistent and transitory components. To have a
broad empirical base, we exploit micro data fromGermany (firm-level), Chile, Colom-
bia, and Indonesia (plant-level). Between 61% and 94% of the cross-sectional vari-
ance in labor and capital productivity is explained by their persistent components.
The result is even stronger for capital intensity where the fraction explained by the
persistent component is above 77% for all countries. Furthermore, the persistent
components of labor and capital productivity are negatively correlated, while their
transitory components are positively correlated. In addition, persistent differences
in capital intensity are less dispersed in more competitive environments, i.e. where
markups are persistently lower. Firms/plants in the most competitive quintile exhibit
a 30-50% lower variance of capital intensity than those in the least competitive quin-
tile. In summary, the data qualitatively supports the idea of a friction in technology
choice driving productivity dispersions.
We use this framework to quantify the effects of a frictional technology choice in
aggregate productivity. Despite the large cross-sectional productivity dispersion, our
estimated efficiency losses from misallocation are on average 5%, which is small rela-
tive to the estimates from the literature. Important for this is our focus on productive
efficiency, i.e. deviations from optimal capital intensity. In contrast, studies like Hsieh
and Klenow (2009) have taken a broader focus including allocative efficiency, i.e. de-
viations from optimal scale. We disregard those deviations, showing up as dispersions
in markups, for our efficiency calculations for two reasons. First, these dispersions
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might reflect efficient differentiation within industry. For example, they might stem
from alternative strategies on product quality or range (e.g. Bar-Isaac et al., 2012),
think of generics vs. patented pharmaceuticals. Second, there is already a broad set of
theories predicting markup dispersions to which we have little to add. Think models
with price setting frictions á la Calvo (1983), with building a customer base (Gou-
rio and Rudanko, 2014), or with entry dynamics and innovation as in Peters (2013).
All of these provide explanations of productivity dispersions through heterogeneous
markups as endogenous objects. At the same time, our data suggests that markup
dispersions themselves explain only a minority of all productivity dispersion.
Our results are linked to the traditional putty-clay assumption (Johansen, 1959),
which has been advocated to address a broad array of other empirical phenomena
(Gilchrist and Williams, 2000, 2005; Gourio, 2011). Particularly closely related is Ka-
boski’s (2005) model of putty-clay technology choice under factor price uncertainty.
An important insight from this paper that carries over to our setup is that firms un-
derreact to current prices in setting their technology, such that the regression tech-
niques usually used to identify the long-run elasticity of substitution (see e.g. Raval
(2014) or Oberfield and Raval (2014) for recent contributions or Chirinko (2008)
for an overview) are subject to a downwards bias. In fact, we provide evidence that
this downwards bias is likely substantial. This high elasticity not only has important
implications for income-shares (see e.g. Solow, 1956; Piketty, 2011; Piketty, 2014;
Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2013) but is also key to compute the efficiency losses
from a friction in technology choice.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes our
technology choice model in a simplified two-period setup. This allows us to derive
the main qualitative insights that we have sketched in this Introduction and guides
our empirical analysis in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 presents potential gains from elim-
inating this friction, and Section 2.5 concludes. An Appendix follows.
2.2 Technology Choice Model
To guide our empirical analysis we consider a two-period technology choice model.
We assume a mass of firms of measure one. Each firm, i, is endowed with one plant
that has an exogenously given capital intensity ki =
Ki
Ni
, where Ki is the physical
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amount of capital and Ni is labor. Furthermore, wages, W , and user costs of capi-
tal, R, are exogenously given, but stochastic.
2.2.1 Output choice
Each firm has a constant returns to scale production technology and faces monopo-
listic competition for its product, where the elasticity, ξi, of demand for the product,
yi, of firm i is firm-specific and constant, such that prices are given by
pi =
1
1 − ξi z
ξi
i y
−ξi
i ,
where zi is the stochastic market size for firm i’s product. Unit costs of production
depend on the plant’s capital intensity and factor prices, ci = c(ki,W,R). The firm
maximizes profits, and we assume that the firm needs to decide about output before
knowing actual factor prices and demand. The optimal policy will choose output
in order to stabilize the expected markup at its optimal level. The expected gross
markup is constant, 11−ξi > 1. Denoting the expectations operator as E, it is straight-
forward to show that the profit maximizing output, y∗i and expected profits under
the optimal policy, pi∗, are given by
y∗i =

Ezξii
Ec(ki,R,W )
1/ξi
; pi∗i =
ξi
1 − ξi y
∗
i Ec(ki,R,W ). (2.1)
2.2.2 Revenue productivities
This implies that firms facing higher demand elasticities, ξi, have on average larger
markups and larger revenue factor productivities. Deviations from expected costs,
Eci / ci, and deviations from expected demand, zξii /Ez
ξi
i , lead to additional fluctua-
tions in realized markups, given by:
pi y
∗
i
WNi + RkiNi
=
1
1 − ξi
zξii
Ezξii
Eci
ci
. (2.2)
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Similarly, splitting up this term in two components, these fluctuations move the cap-
ital and labor expenses per value added:
pi y
∗
i
WNi
=
1
1 − ξi
zξii
Ezξii
E(W + Rki)
W
(2.3)
pi y
∗
i
RkiNi
=
1
1 − ξi
zξii
Ezξii
E(W + Rki)
Rki
(2.4)
On the one hand, (2.3) and (2.4) show that firms with higher (target) markups, 11−ξi
exhibit both higher labor and capital productivities. Similarly, positive and unfore-
seen demand shocks, zξii /Ez
ξi
i , increase both factor productivities. Importantly, in a
more general multi-period setup, these deviations from expectations could only be
transitory. On the other hand, firms with higher capital intensity have a lower capital
and higher labor revenue-productivity, even when these capital intensity differences
are expected.
To summarize, productivities differ across firms either because of differences in
size relative to demand (the first two terms) or due to differences in capital intensity
and factor prices (the last term) in (2.3) and (2.4).²
2.2.3 Choice of technology
We assume that in the period preceding production, the firm can opt to replace its
existing plant, setting up a new one with different capital intensity k. In doing so, the
firm compares expected profits with and without technology adjustment to decide
the period preceding production whether to produce with its initially given capital
intensity or to invest in changing the technology. We assume adjustment is costly as
it disrupts production. This disruption summarizes all costs of searching for a tech-
nology, installing it and learning to operate it. Upon adjustment the firm forgoes a
fractionφi of next period’s profits, whereφi stochastic and drawn from a distribution
Φ. The firm draws φi before it decides about adjustment and hence adjusts capital
intensity to kˆ, the capital intensity that minimizes expected unit costs, whenever
²As evident from equation 2.2, in this environment, adding an additional shock to unit costs (a
TFP shock) has the same implications as a demand shock.
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(1−φi)Epi(kˆ)> Epi(ki). This simplifies to
(1 − φi) >

Ec(ki,R,W )
Ec(kˆ,R,W )
 ξi−1
ξi
, (2.5)
using the expressions in (2.1) for expected profits.
Since Ec(ki ,R,W )Ec(kˆ,R,W ) ≥ 1, firms with higher elasticity of demand, ξi, are less likely to ad-
just for a given ex ante capital intensity ki. The reason is that firms with high market
power can offload their higher unit costs to consumers and hence have less incentive
to invest in efficient capital intensities. This is reminiscent of Leibenstein’s (1966)
X-inefficiency of monopolies or Bester and Petrakis’s (1993) results for oligopolies.³
As a result, ex-post capital-intensity will be less dispersed within the group of
firms with low markups than among high-markup firms if the ex-ante distribution of
capital intensities is centered around the cost minimizing level kˆ.
2.2.4 Unit costs
To specify more concretely the relation between capital intensity and unit costs, we
assume that the long-run technology is given by a constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) production function with substitution elasticity σ, such that the output of a
plant with capital intensity ki is given by
yi =
h
αk
σ−1
σ
i + (1 − α)Aσ−1σ
i σ
σ−1
Ni, (2.6)
where A captures (Harrod neutral) labor-augmenting technological change, and α is
the distribution parameter.
This implies that realized unit costs, ci =
RkiNi+WNi
yi
are minimal at capital intensity
k∗, given by
k∗ =

α
1 − α
W
R
σ
A1−σ. (2.7)
³ There is, however, one interesting side result of our setup. One can easily show that under the
specific assumption of an isoelastic demand curve and monopolistic competition, producer profits and
consumer rents are equal and therefore, total social surplus of adjustment as well as the social costs
of adjustment need to be scaled by factor two such that the individual optimal adjustment choice is
socially optimal.
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Now, to obtain an expression that allows us to relate the cross-sectional average
unit costs to the first two moments of the capital intensity distribution, we use a
log second-order approximation around that minimum:
Ex

log
c(ki,R,W )
c(k∗,R,W )

≈ 1
2σ
s∗(1 − s∗)

Ex

log
ki
k∗
2
+ Vx(log ki)

, (2.8)
where s∗ is the capital expenditure share in the cost-minimizing optimum⁴
s∗ = Rk∗ /(W + Rk∗),
and Ex denotes the cross-sectional average and Vx the cross-sectional variance. In
words, the efficiency loss is composed of the average relative difference of capital in-
tensity from its optimum, Ex log(ki / k∗), and the cross-sectional dispersion of capital
intensity across plants, Vx(log ki). Importantly, the higher the elasticity of substitu-
tion between labor and capital, σ, the lower the efficiency loss from not re-setting
capital intensities to their optimum.
2.3 Empirics
2.3.1 Data description
We document factor productivity and capital intensity dispersion in firm-level data
from Germany, and plant-level data from Chile, Colombia and Indonesia. For Ger-
many, we use the balance sheet data base of the Bundesbank, USTAN, which is a
private sector, annual firm-level data available for 26 years (1973-1998).⁵ For Chile,
Colombia and Indonesia, we have plant level data from the ENIA survey for 1995-
2007, the EAM census for 1977-1991 and the IBS dataset for 1988-2010, respec-
tively. These datasets are focused on the manufacturing sector, with the exception
of Germany, which provides information for the entire private non-financial business
sector.⁶
⁴ See Appendix 2.A.2 for details.
⁵ See Bachmann and Bayer (2014) for a detailed description.
⁶ In particular, private non-financial business sector includes Agriculture, Energy and Mining, Man-
ufacturing, Construction, and Trade.
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When preparing the data for our analysis, we make sure to treat them in the most
comparable way. From each survey, we use a firm’s/plant’s four-digit industry code,
wage bill, value-added and book or current value of capital stock. In order to obtain
economically consistent capital series for each firm/plant, we re-calculate capital
stocks using the perpetual inventory method when the data set does not include
estimates of the capital stock at current values. When recalculating the capital stock,
we exploit information of capital disaggregated into structures and equipment, which
allows us to control for heterogeneity in capital composition across plants.
Our capital productivity measure requires information on the real interest rate
and economic depreciation. For the latter, we do not rely on the depreciation reported
by plants, that is potentially biased for tax purposes, but instead use economic de-
preciation rates obtained from National Statistics or external studies if the former is
not available and take the different capital good mixes across firms/plants into ac-
count. Since it is hard to identify the right measure for a real rate for the developing
economies, we instead fix the real rate to 5% for all economies. This implies user costs
of capital Ri t = 5%+δi t .⁷ In generating cross-sectional statistics, time variations in
user costs are controlled for by taking out four-digit industry-year fixed effects. The
data treatment and sample selection is described in detail in Appendix 2.A.1.2.
2.3.2 Productivities and their transitory and persistent component
We compute average factor productivities for capital and labor per firm and year us-
ing the reported value added per firm/plant at current prices, pi t yi t , labor expenses,
WtNi t as reported in the profit and loss statements, and imputed capital expenses,
Ri tKi t . Taking logs, we define revenue productivities of labor and capital
αNit := log(pi t yi t) − log(WtNi t); αKit := log(pi t yi t) − log(Ri tKi t). (2.9)
⁷ The economic depreciation rate of equipment and structures for Germany is obtained from Volk-
swirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung (VGR) while for Chile we obtain time series from Henriquez (2008).
Finally, as for Colombia and Indonesia, we consider the average depreciation in Chile for the available
period given the absence of national data sources. The depreciation rate values are 15.1% (equip-
ment) and 3.3% (structures) in Germany, while they are on average 10.5% (equipment) and 4.4%
(structures) for the rest of the countries.
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Using expenditures and value added implicitly controls for quality differences in both
inputs and outputs (c.f. Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). In addition, we construct markups
as value added relative to total expenditures on labor and capital
mci t := log(pi t yi t) − log(Ri tKi t + WtNi t). (2.10)
Finally, we calculate the price weighted capital intensity,
κi t := log(Ri tKi t) − log(WtNi t). (2.11)
For any of these variables, say x i t , we calculate 5-year moving averages, denoted
x¯ i t :=
1
5
∑2
s=−2 x i t+s, to identify the persistent component and deviations thereof,
xˆ i t := x i t − x¯ i t , to identify the transitory component.
We then take out four-digit industry-year fixed effects and calculate dispersions
and correlations between the factor productivities for each component.
2.3.3 Empirical findings
Table 2.1 reports standard deviations and correlation for labor and capital productiv-
ity and for all four countries. Three observations stand out: First, capital and labor
productivity are positively correlated in the transitory component (ρ ≈ 40%) while
they are negatively correlated in the persistent component (ρ ≈ −20%). Using the
expressions for factor productivities in Section 2.2, see (2.3) and (2.4), deviations
from optimal size are more important in the short run, while deviations from optimal
capital intensity are more important in explaining long-run productivity differences.
Second, the persistent components in productivity explain the vast majority of cross-
sectional productivity differences (between 60% and 92% for labor and between
79% and 94% for capital). Third, the developing economies show larger productiv-
ity dispersions.
As the positive/negative correlation pattern between labor and capital productiv-
ity is a particularly important prediction of technology choice, we check whether this
pattern holds within the four-digit industries. Figure 2.1 shows that this is the case
for the vast majority of industries.
In light of our results in Section 2.2, it is useful to look at markup and capital
intensity differences, see Table 2.2. In particular, (2.8) allows us to relate the latter
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Figure 2.1. Correlations of factor productivities by four-digit industry
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Notes: Transitory (Persistent) Correlation: Correlation between the transitory (persistent) com-
ponent of labor and capital productivity at the firm/plant level, controlling for time-fixed ef-
fects. Each circle represents a four digit industry, where the size of a circle reflects aggregate
employment in that industry. For this figure, we restrict industries to include at least 20 firms/
plants. The number of industries inside the upper-left quadrant is 99 (out of 125) in Germany,
45 (out of 61) in Chile, 62 (out of 73) in Colombia, and 85 (out of 90) in Indonesia.
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Table 2.1. Transitory and persistent components of factor productivities
std(αˆLi t) std(αˆ
K
it) ρ(αˆ
L
i t , αˆ
K
it) std(α¯
L
i t) std(α¯
K
it) ρ(α¯
L
i t , α¯
K
it)
Transitory Component Persistent Component
DE 0.066 0.119 0.352 0.229 0.456 -0.207
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
CL 0.184 0.281 0.449 0.232 0.577 -0.190
(0.006) (0.008) (0.017) (0.009) (0.028) (0.021)
CO 0.144 0.172 0.517 0.257 0.568 -0.234
(0.003) (0.004) (0.012) (0.008) (0.023) (0.018)
ID 0.211 0.369 0.343 0.255 0.669 -0.269
(0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.013) (0.009)
Notes: Cross-sectional standard-deviations (std) and correlation (ρ) of transitory and persis-
tent components of labor- and capital productivity, αLi t and α
K
it as in (2.9). DE: Germany, CL:
Chile, CO: Colombia, ID: Indonesia. Transitory and persistent components are obtained by ap-
plying a five year moving average filter. Factor productivities are demeaned by 4-digit industry
and year, and expressed in logs. In parentheses: Clustered standard errors at the firm/plant
level.
directly to increases in unit costs. For all countries, differences in capital intensity
are very persistent. The transitory component makes up only between 4% (Germany)
and 17% (Indonesia) of the total variance. At the same time, persistent differences in
capital intensity are substantially more dispersed in Chile, Colombia, and Indonesia
than they are in Germany with variances being twice as high in Indonesia than in
Germany.
On the contrary, the dispersion of persistent cross-sectional markup differences
is strikingly similar across countries, and transitory differences in markups are an
important component of the total cross-sectional variance of markups – at least in
the developing economies (30% in Colombia, 50% in Chile and Indonesia) but less
so in Germany (12%).⁸
⁸ This might relate to the fact that demand is less stable in the developing economies. In fact,
the cross-sectional standard deviation of value-added growth is two to four times larger in these
economies than in Germany.
16 | 2 Productivity Dispersions: Could it Simply be Technology Choice?
Table 2.2. Transitory and persistent components of markup and capital intensity
std(mˆc i t) std(κˆi t) ρ(mˆc i t , κˆi t) std(m¯c i t) std(κ¯i t) ρ(m¯c
L
i t , κ¯i t)
Transitory Component Persistent Component
DE 0.064 0.114 -0.155 0.172 0.551 0.062
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
CL 0.177 0.258 -0.090 0.184 0.661 -0.085
(0.005) (0.009) (0.017) (0.005) (0.029) (0.022)
CO 0.134 0.157 -0.016 0.206 0.676 -0.232
(0.003) (0.004) (0.012) (0.005) (0.025) (0.018)
ID 0.203 0.357 -0.120 0.195 0.778 -0.021
(0.002) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.014) (0.010)
Notes: Capital intensities, κi t , and markups, mci t , as defined in (2.10) and (2.11). See notes of Ta-
ble 2.1 for further explanation.
These results along with (2.3) and (2.4) suggest that an important component in
the persistent differences in productivity is the choice of capital intensities; deviations
in optimal scale being important but minor.
To understand to what extent firms actively take these unit cost increases into
account, we split the sample according to firm/plant characteristics – age, size, and
importantly a firm’s average markup – and compute again the dispersions of the
persistent component of capital intensity, see Table 2.3. While there are some dif-
ferences in these dispersions according to age and size, these are neither large nor
systematic. What stands out is splitting the sample according to the average markup.
The highest markup quintile exhibits between 30% and 60% higher capital intensity
dispersions (in terms of variances) than the lowest markup quintile. This is in line
with the qualitative predictions of our model.
We framed our empirical analysis based on a frictional technology adjustment
economy. Yet, could the observed dynamics be rationalized by factor adjustment fric-
tions? In Appendix 2.A.3 we show that a dynamic model of capital adjustment costs
calibrated to the German economy is unable to explain our empirical results. While
this model can explain the overall dispersion in factor productivities, the model gen-
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Table 2.3. Persistent component of capital intensity by firm/plant characteristics
std(κ¯i t)
Markups Size Age
Bottom Top Bottom Top
Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile Young Old
DE 0.545 0.622 0.610 0.509 n.a. n.a.
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
CL 0.568 0.713 0.749 0.622 n.a. n.a.
(0.042) (0.075) (0.068) (0.058)
CO 0.547 0.694 0.763 0.669 0.697 0.699
(0.035) (0.061) (0.051) (0.061) (0.100) (0.048)
ID 0.716 0.834 0.830 0.816 0.770 0.801
(0.028) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.058) (0.038)
Notes: Bottom (top) markup quintile: firm/plant average markup below the 20th percentile
(above the 80th percentile). Old (young): Plant age below 4 years (above 15 years). Bottom (top)
size quintile: firm/plant average employment below the 20th percentile (above 80th percentile).
The micro data from Germany and Chile does not include age. See notes of Table 2.1 and 2.2 for
further explanation.
erates long-lived differences in capital productivity that are too small compared to
our empirical results and short-lived differences that are too large. In addition, the
correlations between labor and capital productivity show the wrong signs when we
split it into transitory and persistent components. This result is common to any model
with different degrees of flexibility in labor and capital. When one factor is more flex-
ible than the other, a firm will use the more flexible factor strongly to accommodate
shocks to its optimal scale.
2.3.4 Robustness
We conduct some robustness checks based on our baseline results from section 2.3.3.
First, we show that our empirical findings are robust to alternative way of decompos-
ing into transitory and persistent components (Table 2.4), and to weighting of the
moments (Table 2.5). We also show that persistent capital intensity differences are
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more dispersed for high-markup firms/plants even controlling for size and age (Table
2.6). To compute the latter, we first remove cross sectional differences in log capital
intensity that can be explained by markups, size and age in logs. Finally, the variance
of the unexplained component from first stage is regressed as a function of the stan-
darized markups, size and age in logs. For all countries, except Colombia, markups
are as important as size for explaining persistent differences in capital-intensity.
Table 2.4. Robustness: Transitory and persistent components (HP-filtered) of factor
productivities, markups, and capital intensity
std(αˆLi t) std(αˆ
K
it) ρ(αˆ
L
i t , αˆ
K
it) std(α¯
L
i t) std(α¯
K
it) ρ(α¯
L
i t , α¯
K
it)
Transitory Component (HP) Persistent Component (HP)
DE 0.062 0.113 0.352 0.236 0.471 -0.223
CL 0.169 0.260 0.447 0.231 0.578 -0.191
CO 0.134 0.159 0.516 0.257 0.569 -0.234
ID 0.196 0.343 0.344 0.256 0.670 -0.270
std(mˆci t) std(κˆi t) ρ(mˆci t , κˆi t) std(m¯ci t) std(κ¯i t) ρ(m¯ci t , κ¯i t)
Transitory Component (HP) Persistent Component (HP)
DE 0.073 0.134 -0.184 0.157 0.490 0.089
CL 0.183 0.295 -0.123 0.152 0.552 -0.097
CO 0.145 0.186 -0.066 0.178 0.594 -0.230
ID 0.207 0.412 -0.130 0.160 0.672 -0.027
Notes: Labor productivity, aLi t , and capital productivity, a
K
it , as defined in (2.9).
Markups, mci t , and capital intensity, κi t , as defined in (2.10) and (2.11). HP: re-
sults based on the decomposing between transitory and persistent using a HP-filter
(λ= 6.25). Factor productivities are demeaned by 4-digit industry and year and
expressed in logs. Standard errors are clustered standard errors at the firm/plant
level. ρ denotes correlation. DE: Germany, CL: Chile, CO: Colombia, ID: Indonesia.
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Table 2.5. Robustness: Weighted second moments of factor productivities, markups, and
capital intensity at different frequencies
std(αˆLi t) std(αˆ
K
it) ρ(αˆ
L
i t , αˆ
K
it) std(α¯
L
i t) std(α¯
K
it) ρ(α¯
L
i t , α¯
K
it)
Transitory Component (5Y MA) Persistent Component (5Y MA)
DE 0.050 0.101 0.316 0.196 0.457 -0.176
CL 0.187 0.281 0.457 0.239 0.551 -0.205
CO 0.143 0.170 0.520 0.260 0.562 -0.239
ID 0.216 0.370 0.349 0.263 0.672 -0.275
std(mˆc i t) std(κˆi t) ρ(mˆc i t , κˆi t) std(m¯c i t) std(κ¯i t) ρ(m¯c i t , κ¯i t)
Transitory Component (5Y MA) Persistent Component (5Y MA)
DE 0.052 0.090 -0.161 0.172 0.503 0.067
CL 0.179 0.259 -0.090 0.183 0.645 -0.087
CO 0.133 0.155 -0.016 0.209 0.670 -0.237
ID 0.207 0.356 -0.123 0.198 0.787 -0.021
Notes: abor productivity, aLi t , and capital productivity, a
K
it , as defined in (2.9).
Markups, mci t , and capital intensity, κi t , as defined in (2.10) and (2.11). Cross-
sectional standard-deviations (std) and correlation (ρ) of transitory and persistent
components. Transitory and persistent components are obtained by applying a five
year moving average filter (5Y MA). Moments are weighted based on the value-
added of the plant/firm. Variables under interest are demeaned by 4-digit indus-
try and year and expressed in logs. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered
standard errors at the firm/plant level. DE: Germany, CL: Chile, CO: Colombia, ID:
Indonesia.
2.4 Efficiency losses from a friction in technology choice
We consider the framework from Section 2.2 and the empirical results from Section
2.3 to quantify the efficiency losses from frictional technology choice. To do so, we
require an estimate of the capital share in each economy and the elasticity of substi-
tution between labor and capital.
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Table 2.6. Robustness: Regression on the variance in the unexplained persistent component
of capital intensity
DE CL CO ID
var(εκ¯i t )
Log-Markup 0.024 0.069 0.036 0.057
(0.003) (0.017) (0.019) (0.011)
Log-Size -0.026 -0.068 -0.057 0.017
(0.003) (0.017) (0.024) (0.015)
Log-Age - 0.044 0.009
- (0.018) (0.011)
Notes: The results are obtained based on a two step pro-
cedure. First, we remove cross sectional differences in
log capital intensity (κ) that can be explained by the de-
meaned log of markups, size and age. Second, the vari-
ance of the estimated residual based on the first stage
(εκ¯i t ), is regressed as a function of the standarized log of
markups, size and age. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered standard errors at the firm/plant level. DE:
Germany, CL: Chile, CO: Colombia, ID: Indonesia.
We compute the capital share based on the ratio of capital expenditures to total
expenditures from our micro-data, while we estimate the elasticity of substitution
based on country-panel data from Feenstra et al. (2015).⁹
The elasticity of substitution between labor and capital can be recovered from
time-series information of the aggregate capital intensity and the relative factor price.
In a frictionless economic environment, the parameter is determined by the contem-
poraneous regression between these variables. However, the identification is prob-
lematic under the presence of frictions which prevents immediate adjustment of pro-
duction factors. Consequently, the contemporaneous reaction from exogenous price
movements (short-run elasticity) differs from the final target (long-run elasticity).
In order to uncover the long-run elasticity of substitution, we instrument observed
relative factor prices with the top marginal income tax rate on domestic corporations
⁹We obtain a capital share of 21% (Germany), 40% (Colombia), 32% (Chile), and 23% (Indone-
sia).
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Table 2.7. Estimation of long-run elasticity of substitution
Dependent variable: log
 
K
N

log
 
W
R

0.68 0.43 1.28
(0.01) (0.01) (0.35)
Constant 39.41 19.40 135.97
(1.82) (1.40) (48.24)
Trend Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes
Instrument No No Yes
R2 0.76 0.75 0.71
Countries 99 99 99
Obs 2609 2609 2609
Notes: Regressions based on country panel data for
the period 1956-2002. Period length differs by coun-
try due to data availability. We instrument relative fac-
tor price using the top marginal income tax rate on
domestic corporations at the country level. Standard
errors in parenthesis.
at the country level.¹⁰ As our instrumental variable is highly persistent, we capture
movements in factor prices that are long-lived, and thus, we obtain a closer approxi-
mation to the long-run elasticity of substitution.¹¹
Table 2.7 provides the results from this exercise. Once we instrument the relative
factor price with corporate taxes, we obtain an estimated elasticity of 1.28. As argued
before, the simple contemporaneous regression would imply a 50% lower estimated
elasticity.
Based on these estimates, we compute the efficiency losses from a friction in
technology choice. On average, unit costs increase, on average, by 5% compared to
¹⁰Given that we do not have information on real interest rate from all countries in the World, we
approximate the risk-free interest rate using the Federal Funds rate (yearly average). We consider
country panel data on labor, capital, and hourly wage from Feenstra et al. (2015). We impute hours
worked at those countries with missing information by the average hours worked at each year based
on those countries with available data. Finally, we construct tax series using the World tax Database
available at http://www.bus.umich.edu/otpr/otpr/default.asp.
¹¹Alternatively, the literature aims to estimate the long-run elasticity of substitution using cointe-
gration properties, cross country variation in the trends of factor prices, or low-pass filter. See Chirinko
(2008) for more details.
22 | 2 Productivity Dispersions: Could it Simply be Technology Choice?
their minimum obtained by always setting capital intensity to the optimal level, the
values range goes from 2.5% in Germany to 6.3% in Indonesia.
Notice that our estimates of efficiency losses do not consider in the calculation the
time-series component
 
E xt log ki t − log k∗
2
. To do so, we require a dynamic version
of the model described in Section 2.2. Therefore, our estimates constitute a lower
bound of the potential efficiency losses from a friction in technology choice.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper asks whether productivity dispersions should be understood as a result
of frictions in technology choice. We have derived qualitative implications of such
friction and show that these are borne out empirically.
In line with the existing literature, we find large productivity differences across
firms/plants even within narrowly defined industries. We show that most of the dif-
ferences are long lived and related to highly persistent differences in capital intensity.
Despite the strong relative differences across countries our estimated efficiency losses
from a friction in technology choice are, on average, 5%.
For future work it would be important to explore whether a dynamic model of
technology choice is able to explain our empirical results not only qualitatively, but
also quantitatively. This model would allows us to account for all components driving
the efficiency losses from a friction in technology choice.
Appendix 2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Empirics
2.A.1.1 Description of the data
German Firm Data: USTAN (Unternehmensbilanzstatistiken)
USTAN is itself a byproduct of the Bundesbank’s rediscounting and lending activ-
ity. The Bundesbank had to assess the creditworthiness of all parties backing promis-
sory notes or bills of exchange put up for rediscounting (i.e. as collateral for overnight
lending). It implemented this regulation by requiring balance sheet data of all parties
2.A Appendix | 23
involved, which were then archived and collected, see Bachmann and Bayer (2013)
for details. Our initial sample consists of 1,846,473 firm-year observations. We re-
move observations from East German firms to avoid a break of the series in 1990.
Finally, we drop the following sectors: hospitality (hotels and restaurants), financial
and insurance institutions, public health and education sectors. The resulting sample
covers roughly 70% of the West-German real gross value added in the private non-
financial business sector. In particular, it includes Agriculture, Energy and Mining,
Manufacturing, Construction, and Trade.
Chilean Plant Data: ENIA (Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual)
ENIA is collected by the National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Es-
tadÃŋsticas, INE) and provides plant-level data from 1995 to 2007. ENIA contains
information for all manufacturing plants with total employment of at least ten. For
the period under analysis, we have a sample of 70,217 plant-year observations. Ac-
cording to INE, this sample covers about 50% of total manufacturing employment.
Colombian Plant Data: EAM (Encuesta Anual Manufacturera)
EAM is a plant-level survey collected by National Institute of Statistics (Depar-
tamento Administrativo Nacional de Estaditicas, DANE) for the period 1977 to 1991.
The survey covers information for all manufacturing plants during 1977-1982, while
it only contains data on plants above 10 employees for 1983-1984, and from 1985,
small plants are included in small proportion. This results in 103,011 plant-year ob-
servations.
Indonesian Plant Data: IBS (Survei Tahunan Perusahaan Industri Pengolahan)
IBS is the IndonesianManufacturing Survey of Large andMediumEstablishments,
provided by the National Institute of Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS). The sur-
vey covers all plants with 20 or more employees in the manufacturing sector. Given
that the capital stock is reported since 1988 onwards, we exclude earlier years and
focus on the period 1988-2010, with 485,052 plant-year observations.
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2.A.1.2 Sample selection
Starting from the raw data set, we concentrate on describing the general cleaning
steps common to all countries, and we provide more information about country-
specific cleaning steps at Table 2.8.
To begin with, we remove observations where firms or plants report extraordi-
narily large depreciation rates (e.g. due to fire or accident). The reason is that our
dynamic model does not capture such cases, and the perpetual inventory method
(PIM) will inaccurately measure the actual capital stock after such incidents occur.¹²
Next, for those countries where current values of capital stock is not provided (Ger-
many and Colombia), we recompute capital stocks using the PIM. In conducting the
PIM, we drop a small amount of outliers, as explained in Section 2.A.1.4. Further,
we do not consider observations where value-added, capital stock, or employment is
non-positive or missing.
Moreover, we do not consider observations where firms/plants have missing val-
ues in the changes of employment (N), real capital (K) and real value-added (VA).¹³
To construct capital productivity, we use the lagged value of capital stock, so we effec-
tively discard the first year of each micro unit. We remove outliers in the levels and in
the relative changes of employment, capital, value-added, and factor shares based on
3 standard deviations from the industry-year mean. In addition, we drop firm/plant-
year observations whenever the total factor expenditures share is either below 1/3
or above 3/2, and whenever the firm/plant average total factor expenditure share
is above 1. These two cleaning steps should exclude units from our analysis which
report continuously unreasonably large markups or losses.
Finally, as our empirical results rely on a 5-year moving average filter, we do not
consider firm/plant-year observations that have less than 5 consecutive years.
¹²At some cases in the ENIA, EAM, and IBS surveys, plants do not report depreciation conditional
on positive capital stock. In order to not loose this observations, we impute the depreciation by capi-
tal type and two-digit industry, estimating a random effect model, using as explanatory variable the
log-capital stock. To discard rare depreciation events, we drop observations whenever the reported de-
preciation rate in structures (equipment) is above 40% (60%) yearly. Additionally, we do not consider
those cases where the reported depreciation is below 0.1% (1%) in structures (equipment), yearly.
¹³ To construct measures of real capital stock we consider an index price by each capital type (when
available) using the information of gross fixed capital formation at current and constant prices from
National Accounts, while for for value added we use the GDP price deflator.
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Table 2.8. Sample selection
Criterion/Country Germany Chile Colombia Indonesia
Initial sample 1,846,473 70,217 103,006 485,052
East Germany -115,201 – – –
Additional cleaning steps – – – -32,618
Imputation capital stock – – – +37,341
Rare depreciation events -54,280 -8,197 -6,176 -8,775
Outliers in PIM -73,784 – -4,280 –
Missing values -422,739 -19,589 -29,804 -235,280
Outliers in factor variables -176,232 -12,375 -24,651 -86,070
Less than 5 consecutive years -312,452 -15,479 -14,264 -84,885
Final sample 689,665 14,307 23,831 74,765
Notes: Missing values denote the sum of missing values at log value added, log
capital, factor shares and log changes in employment, capital and value added.
Outliers in factor variables is the sum of all identified outliers at log changes
in employment, real capital and real value added, and factor shares. For more
information with respect to Additional cleaning steps and Imputation of capital
stock in Indonesia, see Section 2.A.1.3.
2.A.1.3 Specific cleaning and imputation steps for IBS
Before proceeding with the general cleaning steps applied to all datasets, we need to
implement some specific corrections at the Indonesian micro-data. In doing so, we
closely follow Blalock and Gertler (2009). First, we correct for mistakes due to data
keypunching. If the sum of the capital categories is a multiple of 10n (with n being
an integer) of the total reported capital, we replace the latter with the sum of the
categories. Second, we drop duplicate observations within the year (i.e. observations
which have the same values for all variables in the survey but differ in their plant
identification number). Third, we re-compute value added whenever their values are
not consistent with the formula provided by BPS. Finally, the survey changed their
industry classification from ISIC Rev. 2 in 1998 to ISIC Rev. 3 in 1999 and to ISIC Rev.
4 in 2010. We use United Nations concordance tables to construct a consistent time
series of four digit industry classification.
Further, the surveys from 1996 and 2006 provides only information on the aggre-
gate capital stock, yet, not disaggregated by capital type (structure and equipment).
To construct an economically reasonable estimate of these variables for these years,
we use the average reported investment share and capital share of capital type in
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the preceding and subsequent year, and impute it, multiplying the aggregate capital
stock and investment with the respective share.
Finally, we impute capital stock for plants, whenever the survey presents missing
values for this variable in plants which reported information in previous and/or sub-
sequent years. Following Vial (2006), we impute capital by type (machinery, vehicles,
land and buildings), using the following regression by two-digit sectoral level:
logKi t = β0 + β1 logKi t−1 + θ lnX i t−1 + µi + εi t
where Ki t is the capital stock of type i, µi plant fixed effects and X i t−1 a set of explana-
tory variables (total output, input, employees, wages, fuel costs and expenditures on
materials, leasing, industrial services and taxes).¹⁴
2.A.1.4 Perpetual inventory method
Whenever the dataset does not directly provide information on a firm’s/plant’s cap-
ital stock at current values (USTAN and EAM), we re-calculate capital stocks using
the perpetual inventory method (PIM), in order to obtain economically meaningful
capital series. In doing so, we follow Bachmann and Bayer (2014). To begin with,
we compute nominal investment series using the accumulation identity for capital
stocks:
pIt Ii,k,t = K
r
i,k,t+1 − K ri,k,t + Dri,k,t ,
where K ri,k,t and D
r
i,k,t are firm/plant i’s reported capital stock and depreciation for
capital type k at time t, respectively. Given that capital is reported at historical prices
and does not reflect the productive (real) level of capital stock, we apply the PIM to
construct economic real capital stock at each type of capital:
Ki,k,1 =
pI1
pIbase
Kai,k,1; Ki,k,t+1 = Ki,k,t(1 − δi,k,t) +
pIt
pIbase
Ii,k,t , ∀t ∈ [0, T]
¹⁴We evaluate the robustness of the imputation procedure, using linear interpolation as an alterna-
tive approach. Our empirical findings are robust to this alternative specification.
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where Kai,k,1 is the accounting value of the capital stock of type k for the first period
we observe the unit, ptpbase Ii,k,t is the real investments in capital k of firm/plant i at
time t and δi,k,t is the reported depreciation rate of capital k by firm/plant i at time
t.¹⁵
Even though the aforementioned procedure makes sure that values follows a eco-
nomically meaningful real capital stock series from second period onwards, it is not
clear whether the starting (accounting) input of capital at the unit, Kai,k,t , reflects
the productive real value. To account and adjust the first period value of capital we
use an iterative approach. In specific, we construct a time average factor φk for each
type of capital. It the first iteration step, the adjustment factor takes value of 1 while
capital is equal to its balanced sheet value. That is, Kni,k,t =
pIt
pIbase
Kai,k,1 for n= 1. For
the subsequent iterations, capital is computed using PIM:
Kni,k,t+1 = K
n
i,k,t(1 − δi,k,t) + ptpbase Ii,k,t ,
while the ajdustment factor is constructed using the ratio between the capital of
consecutive iterations
φnk =
1
NT
∑
i,t
Kni,k,t
Kn−1i,k,t
.
Finally, the capital stock at the first period we observe the unit is adjusted by the
factor φnk . We apply the procedure iteratively until φk converges¹⁶
Kni,k,1 = φ
n−1
k K
n−1
i,k,1.
¹⁵ The reported depreciation rate is adjusted such that, on average, it coincides with the economic
depreciation rate given by National Accounts. To deflate investment series, we compute an investment
good price deflator from each country using the information of gross fixed capital formation at current
and constant prices from National Accounts.
¹⁶We stop whenenever the value of φk is below 1.1. At each iteration step we drop 0.1% from the
bottom and the top of the capital distribution. This cleaning stepmakes sure to not consider episodes of
extraordinary depreciation at the plant, which implies that using reported depreciation rate (adjusted
to have the same average value from National Accounts) do not reflect the capital stock given by the
PIM.
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2.A.2 Second order approximation of unit costs around k∗
For convenience, let us define the relative factor price by R˜t :=
Rt
Wt
and (physical)
output per worker by
f (ki t) :=
Yi t
Ni t
=
h
αk
σ−1
σ
i t + (1 − α)A
σ−1
σ
t
i σ
σ−1
.
Subsequently, marginal costs may be expressed as
ci t = Wt
1 + R˜tki t
f (ki t)
and the first derivative of (log) marginal costs with respect to (log) capital intensity,
∂ log(ci t)
∂ log(ki t)
=
R˜tki t
1 + R˜tki t
− ki t f
′(ki t)
f (ki t)
=
(1 − α)R˜tki t − αk
σ−1
σ
i t
(1 + R˜tki t)(αk
σ−1
σ
i t + (1 − α)A
σ−1
σ
t )
Let us denote above denominator by D ≡ (1+ R˜tki t)(αk
σ−1
σ
i t + (1−α)A
σ−1
σ
t ), and ob-
tain the second derivative as
∂ 2 log(ci t)
∂ log(ki t)2
=
h
(1 − α)Aσ−1σt R˜t − σ−1σ αk−
1
σ
i t
i
ki tD −
h
(1 − α)Aσ−1σt R˜tki t − αk
σ−1
σ
i t
i
D′ki t
D2
.
The cost-minimizing capital intensity k∗ implies ∂ log(ci t)∂ log(ki t) ki t=k∗ = 0, and the second
derivative evaluated at ki t = k∗, where (1−α)A
σ−1
σ
t R˜tk
∗
i t = αk
∗σ−1σ
i t , is
∂ 2 log(ci t)
∂ log(ki t)2 ki t=k∗
=
(1 − α)Aσ−1σt R˜tk∗i t − σ−1σ αk∗
σ−1
σ
i t
D
=
(1 − α)Aσ−1σt 1σ R˜tk∗i t
(1 + R˜tk∗)((1 − α)A
σ−1
σ
t R˜tk∗ + (1 − α)A
σ−1
σ
t )
=
1
σ
R˜tk
∗
(1 + R˜tk∗)2
,
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where the second equation results again from (1−α)Aσ−1σt R˜tk∗ = αk∗σ−1σ . The 2nd
order Taylor expansion directly follows as
log(ci t) − log(c∗) ≈ σ−1 R˜tk
∗
(1 + R˜tk∗)2
1
2
(log(ki t) − log(k∗))2.
2.A.3 Capital adjustment frictions
Could a friction in capital adjustments explain our empirical findings? Asker et al.
(2014) show that capital adjustment frictions can lead to sizeable productivity dis-
persions and are able to explain international differences in capital productivity dis-
persions as well. However, they do not provide a decomposition of productivity dif-
ferences across firms in a persistent and a transitory component and do not report
cross-factor correlations. Thus, we explore whether a model with capital adjustment
frictions can reproduce our empirical results.
2.A.3.1 Model setup
We assume a one-period production lag as an adjustment friction on labor and, disrup-
tion (φF) and convex cost of capital adjustment costs (φC). We consider stochastic
fluctuations for the decisive relative factor costs Wt /Rt , which follows a Gaussian
AR-1 process in logs
ωt = log

Wt
Rt

= (1 − ρω)ω¯ + ρωωt−1 + εωt εωt ∼ N (0, (1 − ρ2ω)σ2ω),
where ρω ∈ (0,1).¹⁷ Similarly, a firm’s market size zi t evolves as
log zi t = (1 − ρz)µz + ρz log zi t−1 + εzt , εzt ∼ N (0, (1 − ρ2z )σ2z ),
whereρz ∈ (0,1). As in Section 2.2, we assume a firm knows only current market size
z and prices ω, when making the decision to adjust technology for the next period.
¹⁷ For simplicity, we model all movements of factor prices as changes in the real wage rate, keeping
interest rates constant.
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Analogously to (2.1), we first define the profit maximizing output/employment
decision and the corresponding maximal level of expected next period’s profits
pi∗(K , z,ω) = max
N ′
Ez′,ω′

z
′ξ [y(K ,N ′)]1−ξ
1 − ξ − WN
′ − RK

,
where output y is given by
y(K ,N) =

αK
σ−1
σ + (1 − α)(AN)σ−1σ  σσ−1 .
Given the disruption cost, the firm chooses between adjusting the stock of capital
and staying put every period, the value of which being va and vn, respectively. On
the other side, the convex cost renders large capital adjustments less attractive. The
firm’s dynamic problem is described by the following Bellmann equation
v(K , z,ω) = βmax

va(K , z,ω), vn(K , z,ω)
	
va(K , z,ω) = max
K ′

(1 − φF)pi∗(K ′, z,ω) − φCK

K ′ − K
K
2
+ Ez′,ω′

v(K ′, z′,ω′)

vn(K , z,ω) = pi∗((1 − δ)K , z,ω) + Ez′,ω′

v((1 − δ)K , z′,ω′)
2.A.3.2 Calibration
We calibrate our model to Germany. A first set of parameters are calibrated outside
themodel – those parameters that can be observed directly in the data independent of
our model: the average relative factor price ω¯. The latter is given by the interest rate
r, which we set to 5% as in Section 2.3, the depreciation rate δ, taken as the average
implied depreciation rate in the micro data, and the average salary per employee W
from the micro data. We calibrate to annual frequency in line with the frequency of
the micro data.
Moreover, we create five groups of firms representing the empirical quintiles of
the observed markups in the micro data. We set the persistence of shocks to market
size z to ρz = 0.9675 in line with Bachmann and Bayer (2013) that uses the same
micro data for Germany. The baseline values of parameters calibrated outside the
model is reported in Table 2.9.
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Table 2.9. Parameters calibrated outside the model
Interest rate r 0.05
Depreciation rate δ 0.09
Avg. real wage (in 1,000 DM) W 29.2
Demand shifter persistence ρz 0.9675
Demand elasticity ξ1 0.19
(5 equally ξ2 0.27
large groups) ξ3 0.33
ξ4 0.38
ξ5 0.48
Notes: Real wage W is expressed in Deutsche
Mark (1986), which equals 3/4 Euro (2005).
What remains to be calibrated are the parameters of the production function σ,
α and A0, the standard deviation and persistence of relative factor prices σω and ρω,
the standard deviation and mean of the demand shifter σz and µz, as well as the ad-
justment cost distribution. Of course all parameters are calibrated jointly, but to guide
intuition, we link each parameters to those single data moments most informative for
them. We calculate all model moments as averages from the corresponding moments
of 200 model simulations over 20 periods each (excluding 200 burn-in periods).
To fix µz we target average total costs, while σz is identified by the volatility of
demand shocks σz from value added fluctuations.
We calibrate the CES-production function parameters A0 and α using transformed
capital and labor shares as calibration targets – a method suggested by Cantore and
Levine (2012).¹⁸ We define
ψN := (1 − s)

EX
N
σ−1
σ
; ψK := s

EX
K
σ−1
σ
(2.12)
where N =
∑
i,t Ni,t , K =
∑
i,t Ki,t are aggregate labor and capital, respectively, EX =∑
i,t(WtNi t + RtKi t) is aggregate total expenditure, s =
∑
i,t RtKi t
EX is the aggregate share
of capital in total expenditures. Notice that in a frictionless, static version of this
¹⁸We assume the units of measurement being the number of workers and capital measured in
consumption goods expressed in a money value for a baseline year.
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model,ψN andψK are invariant to relative factor prices and map directly into α and
A0 in (2.6).
To calibrate the factor price process, we let the model match the time series be-
havior of the aggregate labor share. We opt for the labor share instead of a direct mea-
sures of factor prices to control for endogenous reactions of factor prices to shocks
to factor augmenting technological change. For our calibration, we first estimate an
AR-1 process for the labor share using national statistics data.¹⁹ We use aggregate
data here instead of the micro data in order to obtain a longer time series. We then
replicate this estimation on simulated data and choose σω and ρω in order to match
the empirical labor share process for Germany. We find substantial fluctuations in
the German labor share that are fairly persistent, see Table 2.10.
These fluctuations are also closely linked to the substitution elasticity, σ, of the
long-run technology. As elaborated in Section 2.4, a regression of the aggregate cap-
ital intensity on current factor prices no longer identifies the long-run elasticity of
substitution. In a static setup, a regression of the aggregate capital intensity on the
contemporaneous relative factor priceω identifies the long-run elasticity of substitu-
tion σ, see (2.7). In our frictional dynamic setup, this is no longer the case.
The estimated regression coefficient, σˆ, will only recover an average correlation,
which we refer to as aggregate short-run elasticity of substitution. This will be an
average of how current relative factor prices ωt correlate with the various capital
intensities, weighted by their share in the economy.
Yet, such measure of the short-run aggregate elasticity – the regression coeffi-
cient of aggregate capital intensity, log(
∑
i Ki t)− log(
∑
i Ni t), on relative factor prices
ωt – is informative for the long-run elasticity.
We therefore calibrate σ by matching an aggregate short-run substitution elastic-
ity of 0.75 which is mid-range of the numbers summarized in Chirinko (2008). We
provide extensive robustness checks with respect to this calibration target.
Finally, to calibrate fixed and convex adjustment costs, we target the skewness
and kurtosis of gross investment rates for the German USTAN data as in Bachmann
and Bayer (2013).
¹⁹Given there is no available information on the labor share in manufacturing at Indonesia from
National Statistics, we opt to construct aggregate labor share using the micro data.
2.A Appendix | 33
Table 2.10. Parameters calibrated within the dynamic model
Calibration targets Data Model
Avg. factor expenditures (in 1,000,000 DM) 7.54 6.31
log(VA) std. 1.24 1.15
Transformed capital share, ψK 0.17 0.16
Transformed labor share, ψN 210.90 218.96
Aggr. labor share std. (in %) 3.30 5.13
Aggr. labor share persistence (in %) 88.1 87.6
Aggr. (short-run) substitution elasticity 0.75 0.75
Skewness gross investment rate 2.19 2.35
Kurtosis gross investment rate 20.04 18.91
Calibrated model parameters
CES substitution elasticity σ 2.13
CES capital weight (in %) α 16.80
CES labor productivity (in 1,000 DM) A0 33.70
Relative factor price std. (in %) σω 0.78
Relative factor price persistence (in %) ρω 0.30
Demand shifter std. σz 1.20
Demand shifter mean (in 1,000,000 DM) µz 7.60
Disruption cost φF 0.18
Quadratic cost φC 0.06
Notes: Calibration targets K /N andWN + RK , and parameters µz and
A0 are expressed in Deutsche Mark (1986), which equals 3/4 Euro
(2005). The model is simulated for a set of 200 economies with each
2,000 plants and 20 years. log(VA) std.: Cross-Sectional standard devi-
ation of log of value added of firms.
2.A.3.3 Results
Table 2.11 presents the cross-sectional standard deviations from the simulated model.
The cross sectional dispersions are obtained as averages over 200 sets of economies
where we simulate 2,000 plants for 20 years.
As shown in as in Asker et al. (2014), capital adjustment frictions can explain the
overall dispersions in capital productivities well, and in our model account for 88%
of the total empirical variance.
However, the model generates long-lived differences in capital productivity that
are too small compared to the data (55% of the variance) and short-lived differences
that are too large (330% of the variance). In addition, the correlations between labor
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Table 2.11. Transitory and persistent components of factor productivities, markups, and
capital intensities in the capital adjustment model
Transitory Component Persistent Component
std(αˆLi t) std(αˆ
K
it) ρ(αˆ
L
i t , αˆ
K
it) std(α¯
L
i t) std(α¯
K
it) ρ(α¯
L
i t , α¯
K
it)
Data 0.07 0.12 0.35 0.23 0.46 -0.21
Baseline 0.02 0.25 -0.92 0.15 0.37 0.40
std(mˆc i t) std(κˆ
K
it) ρ(mˆc
L
i t , κˆ
K
it) std(m¯c
L
i t) std(κ¯
K
it) ρ(m¯c
L
i t , κ¯
K
it)
Data 0.06 0.11 -0.16 0.17 0.55 0.06
Baseline 0.03 0.27 -0.82 0.15 0.34 -0.38
Notes: Cross-sectional standard-deviations (std) and correlation (ρ) of transitory and
persistent components of labor- and capital productivity, αLi t and α
K
it as in (2.9), and
capital intensities, κi t , and markups, mci t , as defined in (2.10) and (2.11). All second
moments are computed as averages over 200 sets of economies simulated with 2,000
plants and for 20 years.
and capital productivity show the wrong signs when split into transitory and persis-
tent components. This mechanically implies transitory differences in capital intensity
making up a large part (40%) of the model’s total capital-intensity variance. Again
this stands in sharp contrast to the data. Table 2.12 shows that these patterns are
highly robust to the model calibration.
The reason for this lies in the basic mechanics of any model with different degrees
of flexibility in labor and capital. When one factor is more flexible than the other, a
firm will use the more flexible factor strongly to accommodate shocks to its optimal
scale. For example, as demand z in the capital-adjustment model goes up, the firm
wants to raise production and will do so by hiring more labor on impact and only
subsequently adjust capital. Therefore, capital intensity drops on impact and recovers
thereafter.
This shows how idiosyncratic shocks to optimal scale translate directly into transi-
tory idiosyncratic movements in capital intensity in any model that features different
degrees of flexibility of labor and capital. As discussed before, our calibrated model
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indeed implies too large transitory differences in capital intensity relative to persis-
tent ones.
Table 2.12. Alternative calibrations of capital adjustment costs model, Germany
Transitory Component Persistent Component
std(αˆLi t) std(αˆ
K
it) ρ(αˆ
L
i t , αˆ
K
it) std(α¯
L
i t) std(α¯
K
it) ρ(α¯
L
i t , α¯
K
it)
Data 0.07 0.12 0.35 0.23 0.46 -0.21
Baseline 0.02 0.25 -0.92 0.15 0.37 0.40
D.log(VA) 0.01 0.14 -0.91 0.15 0.23 0.74
Ela. 0.5 0.01 0.22 -0.86 0.14 0.41 0.62
Ela. 1.0 0.03 0.29 -0.92 0.15 0.41 0.30
50% σω 0.02 0.31 -0.94 0.15 0.38 0.34
std(mˆc i t) std(κˆ
K
it) ρ(mˆc
L
i t , κˆ
K
it) std(m¯c
L
i t) std(κ¯
K
it) ρ(m¯c
L
i t , κ¯
K
it)
Data 0.06 0.11 -0.16 0.17 0.55 0.06
Baseline 0.03 0.27 -0.82 0.15 0.34 -0.38
D.log(VA) 0.02 0.15 -0.93 0.15 0.16 -0.31
Ela. 0.5 0.02 0.23 -0.85 0.16 0.34 -0.59
Ela. 1.0 0.03 0.32 -0.79 0.15 0.39 -0.36
50% σω 0.04 0.33 -0.88 0.15 0.35 -0.38
Notes: In the third row, D.log(VA) is as the baseline model but targets the cross sectional
dispersion of first differences of log value added instead of the dispersion in log value
added. Ela. 0.5 and 1.0 refer to changing the target aggregate short-run substitution elas-
ticity to 0.5 and 1.0, respectively. 50% σω recalibrates the model with a 50% smaller dis-
persion in relative factor dispersion. See notes of Table 2.11 for further explanation.
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3Do Plants Freeze Upon Uncertainty
Shocks?
Joint with Matthias Meier
3.1 Introduction
It has been well documented that uncertainty is high during recessions. However,
there is no consensus whether changes in uncertainty can actually lead to sizable
business cycle fluctuations. The underlying effects differ substantially depending on
the transmissions mechanism through which it affects the economy.
In this paper we assess through which channels uncertainty shocks impact em-
ployment by studying its effects on the creation and destruction of jobs. To guide
our empirical analysis, we consider a dynamic problem of the plant facing frictions
in factor adjustments, price rigidities, or financial frictions.
The qualitative response of job flows to an uncertainty shock depends on the
channel by which it affects the economy. Under costly labor adjustments, an unex-
pected increase in uncertainty causes plants to temporarily stop their employment ad-
justments and, consequently, there are less jobs created and destroyed. Analogously,
given costly capital adjustments, heightened uncertainty leads to higher inactivity of
investments adjustments, which implies a decline of capital and labor demand due
to complementarity in the production. Further, under staggered price-setting, plants
respond to an uncertainty shock by setting a higher price relative, as the profit func-
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tion is asymmetric in the price. As a result, more jobs are destroyed and less jobs
created. Finally, under financial frictions, an increase of uncertainty leads to higher
borrowing costs as default is more likely. Therefore, as the price for the bond declines,
and establishments reduce their exposure to default, there is less creation and more
destruction of jobs.
These, however, are not the only implications. The quantitative effect from an
uncertainty shock depends on the size of these frictions. As higher the degree of
factor adjustment frictions, price flexibility, and vulnerability to financial conditions,
stronger the resulting responses from an uncertainty shock.
To explore whether these implications are borne out empirically, we estimate
the effect of uncertainty shocks on industry-level job flows in the United States. We
construct a new dataset which consists of quarterly job flows at the 4-digit Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) level based on the period 1972-2013. Following the
econometric approach from Davis and Haltiwanger (2001),¹ we consider a sectoral
VAR which contains common aggregate variables - stock market level, uncertainty,
and aggregate job flows - and industry-level job flows. The system is specified such
that the uncertainty shock is common across sectors, while the estimated response
functions differs across sectors.
An unexpected increase in uncertainty leads to more jobs destroyed and less jobs
created for more than 80% of the industries. This finding suggests that plants do not
freeze employment adjustments given this shock.
In order to assess which channels are important for explaining the resulting ef-
fects at the industry-level, we regress the cumulative responses from an uncertainty
shock on variables reflecting factor adjustment frictions, price rigidities, and finan-
cial frictions at the industry. We do not find evidence of factor adjustment frictions
or price rigidities as channels through which uncertainty affects job flows. On the
contrary, financial frictions surges as an important channel. Industries associated to
be more vulnerable to financial conditions report 75% stronger job flow responses
than the least vulnerable industries.
This study is related to a growing literature that analyzes the macroeconomic
effects of uncertainty shocks. The literature discusses several mechanisms through
¹Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) exploits industry-level job flows responses to oil shocks to identify
sectoral characteristics which are related to the effects at the industry-level.
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which uncertainty affects economic activity.² In this paper we assess these mecha-
nisms within a common empirical framework. Our analysis is particularly related to
those studies that evaluates, empirically, the effects of uncertainty shocks on labor
markets. The current available evidence concentrates on the effects at unemployment
rate (Leduc and Liu, 2014), job finding rate (Guglielminetti, 2013), and separation
rate in connection with job finding rate (Riegler, 2014). While our empirical findings
are in line with their results, we differ in that we consider the effects of uncertainty
shocks on the disaggregated responses at the industry-level, which allows us to in-
vestigate which channels matter for explaining the effects of uncertainty shocks in
the economy.
The structure of the paper continues as follows. Section 3.2 analyzes the theo-
retical effect of uncertainty shocks on aggregate job flows based on a model with
factor adjustment costs, price rigidities, or financial frictions. Section 4.2.2 describes
the data used in this study, and it is followed by our estimation strategy in Section
3.3. Section 3.5 makes use of the theoretical implications arrived in Section 3.2, and
empirically assess the importance of each friction for explaining the resulting effects
of uncertainty shocks. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical Background:
We study a dynamic problem of the plant facing either factor adjustment frictions,
price rigidities, or financial frictions. For each case, we aim to understand the im-
plications of uncertainty shocks on the creation and destruction of jobs. Following
Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), we define gross job creation as the total employment
gains from expanding and new establishments in an industry. In a similar manner,
we define gross job destruction as the total employment losses from shrinking and
closing establishments in an industry.
² See, for example, Bloom (2009), Bachmann and Bayer (2013) and Bloom et al. (2014) on factor
adjustment costs, Schaal (2012), Leduc and Liu (2014) and Riegler (2014) on labor search frictions,
Alfaro et al. (2016),Christiano et al. (2010), Arellano et al. (2012), Gilchrist et al. (2013), and Dyrda
(2015) on financial frictions, and Bundick and Basu (2014), Born and Pfeifer (2016), Fernandez-
Villaverde et al. (2015) and Vavra (2014) on price rigidities.
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We consider an economy with a unit mass of plants that produce output yi t based
on a constant returns to scale production function, determined by capital and labor
yi t = L
α
i tK
1−α
i t .
Plants face monopolistic competition and choose its optimal price subject to the de-
mand function
yi t =

zi tPt
pi t
ε
Yt ,
where zi t is the stochastic demand for the product i, Yt is the aggregate demand, and
Pt is the aggregate price. Consequently, revenues are determined as
Ri t = PtY
−1/ε
t zi t L
αµ
i t K
(1−α)µ
i t , (3.1)
where µ≡ ε−1ε .
We assume that idiosyncratic demand z follows a log-normal AR(1) process
log(zi t) = µz + ρ log(zi t−1) + σt−1εi t ,
where εi t ∼ N(0,1) are independent across units, µz = −σt−1 /2, and σt moves ac-
cording to a two state Markov chain, allowing for high and low uncertainty states
σt ∈ {σL,σH} where P(σt+1 = σr |σt = σm) = piσmr
In the following sections we extend the model with micro-level frictions which
shape the response of aggregate job flows from uncertainty shocks.
3.2.1 Labor adjustment frictions
The distribution of net employment growth at the establishment-level exhibits excess
kurtosis. This suggests that net employment changes are lumpy and discontinuous,
and advocates for the presence of non-convex labor adjustment costs at the plant-
level.³ For sufficiently low realizations of demand, establishments lower their labor
³ See, for example, Caballero et al. (1997) and Davis et al. (1998).
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units. Akin, for sufficiently high realizations of demand, establishments increase their
labor units. However, for intermediate values of productivity, not adjusting is more
valuable.
Given an uncertainty shock, the option value of not adjusting increases.⁴ As la-
bor adjustments are costly, a larger share of plants postpone adjustments in order to
avoid incurring costs which are likely to be reversed given higher volatility of eco-
nomic conditions. Therefore, an unexpected rise of uncertainty leads to a decline in
aggregate job creation and job destruction.⁵
For the purpose of understanding the implications of uncertainty shocks under
different degrees of labor frictions we consider a dynamic problem of the plant where
capital stock is freely adjustable and rented at a cost r +δ, while employment ad-
justments are subject to non-convex adjustment costs CL(L, L
′) and pay for a unit of
labor service w. The problem of the plant is given by
V (z, L,σ) = max
L′,K
¦
R(z, L′,K) − wL′ − (r + δ)K − CL(z, L, L′) + βE

V (z′, L′,σ′)
©
,
where CL(L, L
′) includes partial irreversibility costs C pL and fixed costs C
f
L , such that⁶
CL(L, L
′) =
C
f
L + C
p
L | L′ − L | if L′ 6= L,
0 if L′ = L.
⁴ The option value of not adjusting employment surges when we consider a model with non-convex
labor adjustment costs. On the contrary, if we consider convex labor adjustment costs, there is no
option value of remaining inactive, see Bloom (2009).
⁵ In order to arrive to this conclusion, we are implicitly assuming that adjustment costs are born out
on net employment changes as in Cooper and Willis (2009). That is, under the presence of exogenous
quits, labor adjustment costs would be zero if plants adjust employment to offset quits. The literature
alternatively considered exogenous quits in combination with non-convex adjustment costs at gross
employment changes. However, the combination of exogenous labor attrition and sufficiently high
adjustment costs at gross employment changes implies a negative median at the distribution of net
employment growth, while empirically, is commonly non-negative, see Davis and Haltiwanger (1992).
⁶ The fixed costs of labor adjustments are expressed in proportion to profits.
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3.2.2 Capital adjustment frictions
As employment, the distribution of gross investment rate exhibits excess kurtosis and
negative skewness, which suggests that plants face non-convex capital adjustment
costs. This commonly leads to a region of inactivity of investment adjustments.
An unexpected rise of uncertainty increases the region of inactivity.⁷ Given costly
capital adjustments, the option value of not investing increases. Assuming that plants
accumulate capital stock, which declines by depreciation rate if not investing, net
capital decreases at the inactive plants, and labor demand falls indirectly.⁸
This results into less jobs created, as plants who normally invest under low uncer-
tainty levels, do not do so under high uncertainty levels. The effect on job destruction
is unclear. First, there is a downward effect on job destruction from plants that would
sell their capital stock under low uncertainty levels, while they do not do so under
high uncertainty. On the contrary, there is an upward effect on job destruction given
higher inactivity of investment adjustments. As a result, it depends on the relative
strengths of these two forces.
In order to understand the effect of uncertainty on aggregate job flows under
different degrees of capital adjustment costs, we study a dynamic problem of the
plant subject to non-convex capital adjustment costs CK(I) and where labor is freely
adjustable, paying for its labor services w
V (z,K ,σ) = max
L′,I
¦
R(z, L′,K(1 − δ) + I) − wL′ − CK(I) + βE

V (z′,K(1 − δ) + I ,σ′)©
where CK(I) consists of partial irreversibility costs C
p
K and fixed costs C
f
K such that⁹
CK(I) =
C
f
K + I
+ − (1 − C pK)I− if I 6= 0,
0 if I = 0,
⁷ Similar to Section 3.2.1, this conclusion does not hold if we would only consider convex capital
adjustment costs, as there is no option value of remaining inactive.
⁸Using Equation 3.1, the change in labor demand as a function of the change in capital is given
by log(Li t)≈ −(1−α)∆ log(Ki t) /α.
⁹ The fixed costs of capital adjustments are expressed in proportion to profits.
3.2 Theoretical Background: | 43
and I+(I−) are the absolute values of positive (negative) gross investments. Given the
functional form of capital adjustment costs, the resale value of capital is commonly
lower than the purchased value. In this regard, Ramey and Shapiro (2001) exploits
machinery purchases and sales from the aerospace industry and find that capital sells
are commonly subject to a large discount.
3.2.3 Price rigidities
In an economy with monopolistic competition and staggered prices, plants respond
to an uncertainty shock by setting a higher price relative to normal uncertainty level.
The combination of more likely tail events and the profit function being asymmetric
in the price (it is costlier to set a lower price relative to the competition compared to
setting higher relative price) leads to this upward pricing policy. Consequently, there
are less jobs created and more jobs destroyed.¹⁰
In order to explain the effects from uncertainty shocks under different degrees
of price rigidities, we consider a problem of the plant that faces price adjustments
frictions a la Calvo (1983). Furthermore, we allow for fluctuations in the aggregate
price, and assume it follows a log-normal AR(1) process
log(Pt) = µP + ρ log(Pt−1) + σεPt ,
where εPt ∼ N(0,1) are independent across time, µP = −σt−1 /2.¹¹
We restrict plants to set prices before the realization of shocks from the current
period, while labor and capital are freely adjustable, paying for its services the wage
rate w and user cost r +δ, respectively. The dynamic problem of the plant, subject
¹⁰ These implications arise if we assume Rotemberg or Calvo price adjustment costs and prices are
set before shocks realize, see Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2015) and Born and Pfeifer (2016). On the
contrary, if we consider a model with fixed costs of price adjustments and time-varying uncertainty as
in Vavra (2014), an uncertainty shock increases the frequency and volatility of price changes, resulting
into more jobs created and destroyed.
¹¹ In this model, time-varying uncertainty about idiosyncratic demand does not affect plants’ price
policy, while uncertainty about the aggregate price it does. Therefore, we further include time-varying
uncertainty about the aggregate price in this particular model.
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to price rigidity, after maximizing with respect to labor and capital, is determined by
V (z, p, P,σ) = E

θ max
p′
V˜ (z′, p′, P ′,σ′) + (1 − θ)V˜ (z′, p, P ′,σ′)
where θ denotes the price adjustment probability, and V˜ is given by
V˜ (z, p, P,σ) ≡

p
P
−
w
α
α r + δ
1 − α
1−αzP
p
ε
+ βV (z, p, P,σ).
3.2.4 Financial frictions
Fluctuations in uncertainty may, alternatively, impact the economy through finan-
cial frictions. In the following, we consider a dynamic problem of the plant which
highlights the role of liquidity given incomplete financial markets and fluctuations
in uncertainty. This framework allows us to arrive at implications based on the de-
gree of vulnerability to financial frictions. The model described below is in spirit of
the model by Arellano et al. (2012).
To investigate the effects of financial frictions, we assume that plants choose next
period debt level and labor units in the current period. Compared to the previous
setups, we abstract from capital in the economy, and assume that plants are subject
to fixed operating costs F .¹²
The plant may finance its expenditures by issuing a defaultable one-period bond.
The debt contract pays b′ units conditional on not defaulting, and provides qb′ in
return. We consider a simplified financing cost structure, where plants are unable to
finance with equity nor to have negative dividends:
d = R(z, L) − wL − b + q(L′, b′, zt ,σt)b′ − F ≥ 0,
such that whenever this condition does not hold, the plant defaults. In this problem,
default occurs because plants do not have enough liquid funds to manage the low
demand level or high indebtedness.
¹²We assume the production to depend only on labor for model tractability reasons. Furthermore,
we include fixed operating costs in order to generate default in equilibrium. The implications of this
model would still hold if production is determined by labor and capital, and plants make decisions on
the production factors before demand realizes.
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Based on this environment, the value function of a continuing establishment is
given by
V (z, L, b,σ) = max
b′,L′,d
d + νβE[V (z′, L′, b′,σ′)],
where an establishment exogenously exits the market with probability 1− ν every
period.¹³
To derive the price of the bond, we assume that establishments may sign a one
period loan contract with a perfectly competitive financial intermediary. If the plant
saves (b < 0), it does so at the risk free rate. On the contrary, if the plant accumulates
debt, it may default ψ(z, L, b,σ)= 1, and the lender may recover part of what has
been lent by taking possession of the plant, starting with zero debt level, at a cost
ξ.¹⁴ Therefore, the price of the bond is determined as
q(L′, b′|z,σ) =
βE

ψ(z′, L′, b′,σ′) + (1−ψ(z
′,L′,b′,σ′))
b′ min

b′,max

V¯ (z′, L′, 0,σ′), 0
		
if b′ > 0,
β if b′ ≤ 0,
where V¯ (z′, L′, 0,σ′)≡ V (z′, L′, 0,σ′)− ξ. In the next section we evaluate the re-
sponse of job flows from an uncertainty shock at different costs ξ. A lower recovery
value implies higher vulnerability to financial frictions and lower bond price q. The
parameter ξ can be thought of as a cost for processing bankruptcy, but also deter-
mines how much from plants’ value can be collateralized. It is related to the costly
verification problem in Townsend (1979) and Bernanke and Gertler (1989). We dif-
fer in that shocks in our model are persistent and observable by the lender, while in
the other setup, shocks are i.i.d. and unobservable by the lender.
¹³ The assumption of exogenous exit rate motivates the use of debt by plants, see, for example,
Bernanke et al. (1999) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). We assume that whenever a plant defaults
or exogenously exit, it is replaced by identical plant in the next period with zero debt level.
¹⁴We express ξ proportional to optimal revenues in the steady state. As in Gilchrist et al. (2013),
the exogenous exit rate is not included in the loan price. We are implicitly assuming that plants make
their payment decisions before the exit shock realizes.
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3.2.5 The theoretical effects from uncertainty shocks
To solve the dynamic problems, we calibrate the parameters at quarterly frequency, in
line with the frequency of our empirical analysis. We consider standard assumptions
for α, ε, δ, and r. As Cooper and Willis (2009), the wage rate is specified such that
steady state employment at the plant consists of 600 workers.¹⁵ The demand and
uncertainty process are based on the estimated processes from Bloom et al. (2014).¹⁶
Finally, following Gilchrist et al. (2013), we parametrize the exogenous exit rate
based on establishment entry and exit tabulations from the Business Employment
Dynamics, and the fixed operation costs based on the ratio of general expenses to
sales from Compustat data.¹⁷
After solving the dynamic problems, we independently simulate 5000 economies
with 1000 plants, each of 80-quarter length. At each economy, the model is hit with
an uncertainty shock at the fifth quarter.¹⁸ In order to calculate the response of ag-
gregate job flows to an uncertainty shock, we compute aggregate job flows for each
period and average across all economies.
Figure 3.1 shows the impact of an uncertainty shock under different degrees of
frictions. As higher the costs to adjust labor, larger the share of plants which remain
inactive in a given period, but also higher the incentives to postpone adjustments un-
til uncertainty returns back to normal levels. Therefore, as larger the costs to adjust
employment, stronger the decline in aggregate job flows. Similarly, under the capital
frictions, as higher the costs to adjust capital, larger the incentives to postpone invest-
ments and stronger the decline in the creation of jobs. However, as argued in Section
3.2.2, the effect of uncertainty shocks on job destruction is unclear and depends on
the size of capital adjustment costs.
¹⁵ This number corresponds to the average workers at a US manufacturing plant based on the Lon-
gitudinal Research Database, see Caballero et al. (1997).
¹⁶ Bloom et al. (2014) calibrates a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, where firms face
factor adjustment frictions, to quantify the macroeconomic implications of time varying uncertainty.
¹⁷ Based on firm-level data from Compustat, the median ratio of sales, general, and administra-
tive expenses to sales is 22%. As Gilchrist et al. (2013), we assume that 50% of those expenditures
represent fixed costs of operations.
¹⁸ The first 50 simulated economies are discarded such that results are independent of the assumed
initial conditions.
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Table 3.1. Parametrization
Parameter Value Explanation
α 0.65 Labor share in the economy
ε 4 Markup of 33%
β 0.99 Discount factor at quarterly frequency
δ 2.6% Annual capital depreciation of 10%
r 1.01% Annual risk free interest rate of 4%
ρ 0.95 Serial correlation process
σL 0.051 Baseline uncertainty level
σH 4 x σ High uncertainty is four times the baseline level
piσL,H 0.03 Probability from low to high uncertainty
piσH,H 0.92 Probability of remaining at high uncertainty state
All models except financial frictions
w 0.113 Employment at the plant consists of 600 workers in the
steady state
Model with financial frictions
w 0.07 Employment at the plant consists of 600 workers in the
steady state
ν 0.95 Survival probability
F 8 Fixed costs of operations. Represents 11% of optimal
revenues in the steady state
Notes: The demand and uncertainty process are set to the same process as Bloom et al. (2014).
As in the model with financial frictions (Section 3.2.4) we do not consider capital in the economy,
we set w= 0.07 such that optimal employment at the plant is 600 workers in the steady state.
Under price rigidity, the response of job flows from uncertainty shocks are
stronger as lower is the underlying price rigidity in the economy. Those establish-
ments which able to adjust their prices adopt an upward price policy in response to
the shock, while the remaining establishments keep the same price level.
Finally, in an economy with financial frictions, heightened uncertainty increases
the probability of default given that tail shocks are more likely. Therefore, the bond
price declines, which leads to more jobs destroyed and less jobs created. Further-
more, as higher is the vulnerability to financial frictions (higher ξ), lower is the
recovery value under default, resulting into stronger decline of the bond price from
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an uncertainty shock. As a result, the effects on job flows are larger as higher is the
vulnerability to financial frictions.
Our model with financial frictions stress the importance of liquidity. Alternatively,
we may consider an economy where borrowing is subject to collateral constraints.
An increase of uncertainty makes default more likely, which commonly leads lenders
to charge a higher risk premium and raise collateral requirements. Consequently,
establishments reduce the demand for production factors. Importantly, plants with
lower creditworthiness or collateral value, are disproportionally affected from the
shock. As highlighted by Bernanke et al. (1996), given that these businesses are
more exposed to agency and moral hazard problems, the flow of credit declines by
relatively more.¹⁹
¹⁹ In a related framework, Dyrda (2015) considers a model where firms face borrowing constraints
and fluctuations in uncertainty. In his setup, young firms are relatively more constrained in borrowing.
An uncertainty shock leads to tighter borrowing constraints, and affects disproportionally more young
firms.
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3.3 Estimation strategy
Based on these findings, we explore, empirically, the effects of uncertainty shocks on
job flows. We consider a structural vector autoregressive model that contains com-
mon and industry specific variables:
B−1Yt = B0τ + B(L)Yt−1 + ζt , (3.2)
where Yt is a vector of variables containing the log of S&P 500 stock market index,
uncertainty, log of aggregate manufacturing job flows and the log of sectoral job
flows. The matrix B(L) is the pth order matrix polynomial with lag operator L, τ is a
vector of constants, B−1 is the contemporaneous impact matrix and ζ is the vector of
structural shocks. We are interested about recovering impulse responses of sectoral
job flows given a structural shock to uncertainty. Yet, we need to impose restrictions
to obtain structural shocks from the reduced form VAR
Yt = A0τ + A(L)Yt−1 + ωt , (3.3)
where ωt ≡ Bζt is the vector of reduced form residuals.
Following the econometric approach from Davis and Haltiwanger (2001), we par-
tially identify the structural response functions by placing restrictions on A(L) and B.
The restrictions on the former are given by
ai, jc(l) = ai, jd = 0, ∀ l and i = s,u, a jc, a jd
where {s,u, a jc, a jd, jc, jd} denote indicator for the stock market index, uncertainty,
aggregate job flows, and industry-level job flows, respectively, and ai,k(l) denotes the
{ik} element at lag l of A(L). These restrictions allows us to make sure the uncertainty
shock is identical across industries.
Furthermore, we impose restrictions on B. We assume that stock market level is
not contemporaneously affected by an uncertainty shock nor shocks to job flows. In-
cluding the stock market level first in the recursive ordering ensures that uncertainty
shocks are orthogonal to first moment shocks. In addition, we do not allow shocks
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to job flows to contemporaneously affect uncertainty. Finally, we restrict shocks to
industry-level job flows to not contemporaneously affect aggregate job flows.
Since we are only interested about identifying structural innovations to uncer-
tainty, we do not need to fully determine the contemporaneous covariance matrix.
The block recursive nature of the system suffices to identify the responses from this
structural innovation.²⁰
Based on these assumptions, we estimate impulse responses from uncertainty
shocks using local projections. Compared to the estimation of impulse responses di-
rectly from the VAR system, local projections is more robust to misspecification of the
unknown data generation process. It makes use of single coefficient matrices instead
of relying on nonlinear functions of the estimates of the VAR slope parameters (see
Jorda (2005) and Kilian and Kim (2009)). Consider the projection of Yt+h onto the
linear space (Yt−1,Yt−2, ...,Yt−p)′:
Yt+h = µ
h +
P∑
l=1
Mh+1l Yt−1−l + ut+h, (3.4)
where ut+h is the error term which we assume to have zero mean and strictly positive
variance. The resulting impulse response at horizon h from a structural shock to the
i th element in Yt , IR(h, i), is given by
IR(h, i) = Mh1 ci (3.5)
where ci corresponds to the i
th column of matrix B.
3.4 Data
3.4.1 Job Flows
We consider industry-level job flows in the United States from two sources. First, for
the period of 1972-1998, we exploit the series built by Davis et al. (1998), which
provides information at the 4-digit SIC level for 456 manufacturing industries us-
²⁰We do not attempt to achieve identification within aggregate manufacturing job flows and within
sectoral job creation and destruction.
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ing the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD).²¹ We further extend the series until
2013 using the Quarterly Workforce Indicator (QWI), available through the United
States Bureau of the Census (2015). The QWI measures worker and job flows disag-
gregated at the 4-digit NAICS level.²² As participation increased over the period, we
consider only those states who started reporting information earlier than 2000Q2.
The selected sample constitutes 90% manufacturing employment in United States.
We use X-13 ARIMA to remove the seasonal component from the series.²³
Figure 3.2 shows the aggregate time series of manufacturing employment based
on our sample, relative to tabulations from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Given the
limited amount of states in the second sample, our estimated aggregate employment
is lower relative to the aggregate statistics. Yet, the correlation between these series
is 98%. We refer the reader to Appendix 3.A.3 for additional details about this data.
3.4.2 Uncertainty
As uncertainty is not directly observable, the literature relies primarily on financial
and survey indicators to construct proxies. In this study, we consider the variables
constructed by Ludvigson et al. (2015) and Jurado et al. (2015). The authors stress
the importance of distinguishing between variability and predictability of economic
indicators. Taking this into account, they construct macroeconomic uncertainty as
the common factor of uncertainty related to real economic activity, prices, bond
and stock market indexes, among others. Similarly, financial uncertainty is based
on the uncertainty about financial variables, such as credit spreads, valuation ratios,
risk factors, among others. Our baseline analysis is based on the quarterly averaged
²¹ The LRD collects employment information from all US manufacturing establishments with at
least five or more employees and accounts for more than 99% of manufacturing employment in the
country.
²² The QWI is based on the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD). The LEHD con-
sists of linked employer-employee data covering over 95% of US private sector jobs. It considers em-
ployer’s state-specific UI account number as the business identifier. In this respect, the methodology
to identify establishments is equivalent to the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages. See for
more details Abowd and Vilhuber (2011).
²³With the purpose of joining the information under a common industry classification, we use a
correspondence table, provided by the National Bureau of Economic Research, which maps industry
NAICS codes into industry SIC codes.
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Figure 3.2. Aggregate employment in US manufacturing
50
00
10
00
0
15
00
0
20
00
0
 
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t (
T
ho
us
an
ds
)
1970q1 1980q1 1990q1 2000q1 2010q1
 
Quarter
Aggregate QWI
LRD
Notes: Manufacturing employment based on the connected industry sample from LRD and QWI. Aggregate manufactur-
ing employment based on tabulations from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
macroeconomic uncertainty.²⁴ We document in Appendix 3.A.4 our results when us-
ing financial uncertainty.²⁵
3.4.3 Frictions
We aim to understand whether uncertainty shocks affect the economy primarily
through factor adjustment frictions, price rigidities, or financial frictions. For this
purpose, we construct proxies of these frictions at the industry-level. The proxies are
defined such that higher values imply higher degree of frictions at the industry.
3.4.3.1 Labor adjustment frictions
Labor market regulations are generally common to all industries within the same
country. However, the underlying costs for raising hours worked, hiring or firing work-
²⁴ The authors provide proxies of uncertainty for three horizons: 1, 3, and 12 months. Our analysis
is based on the uncertainty based on three months horizons, which coincides with the frequency used
in our empirical analysis. Our findings are robust when using alternative horizons for the uncertainty
proxy.
²⁵ Jurado et al. (2015) provides, additionally, the so-called firm-common uncertainty, which is based
on the cross-sectional dispersion of firm profit growth from Compustat data. However, this time series
extends only until 2011. For this reason, we focus on the alternative proxies.
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ers may differ across industries. Following Botero et al. (2004), we use the share of
full-time workers to proxy for the degree of flexibility of employment contracts and
the cost to layoff workers at the industry. Further, we include the share of total work-
force affiliated to labor unions to approximate for the power of the union at the
industry.²⁶ Finally, we consider the kurtosis of the net employment growth distribu-
tion at the industry. As argued in Section 3.2.1, under the presence of non convex
employment adjustment costs, labor adjustments are infrequent and lumpy, which
creates excess kurtosis relative to a normal distribution.²⁷
3.4.3.2 Capital adjustment frictions
The literature commonly infers the size of capital adjustment costs based on the
distribution of cross sectional gross investment rate. For example, Cooper and Halti-
wanger (2006) and Bachmann and Bayer (2014), document that micro-level gross
investment rate exhibits substantial positive skewness and kurtosis. Non-convex capi-
tal adjustment costs are an important driver of this result. Given non-convexities, cap-
ital adjustments are infrequent and lumpy. As a usual adjustment is large, this leads
to excess kurtosis. Moreover, as businesses may downward adjust capital through
depreciation, negative gross investment is more unlikely and, therefore, we should
expect positive skewness. Consequently, we consider the skewness and kurtosis of the
gross investment rate distribution at the industry level to capture the size of capital
adjustment costs.²⁸ In addition, we include the ratio of structures over equipment at
the industry. In this respect, Caballero and Engel (1999) considers a dynamic capi-
tal adjustment costs model, and finds business-level costs to be more pronounced at
structures relative to equipment.
²⁶ The share of full-time workers and union density are based on the March Supplements from the
Current Population Survey, see Table 3.2. In order to map the industry classification from CPS into
1987 SIC we use a concordance table provided by David Dorn at http://www.dorn.net/data.htm.
²⁷We compute the kurtosis of net employment growth at the industry if we have at least ten observa-
tions at the industry. Given that we lack of sufficient information at the 4-digit SIC level, we compute
it at the 3-digit SIC level. Furthermore, for 10% of the industries, the information at the 3-digit SIC
level is not available, so we impute it by the mean value at the 2-digit SIC level.
²⁸We compute these moments if we have at least ten observations at the industry. Given that we
lack of sufficient information at the 4-digit SIC level, we compute the indicators at the 3-digit SIC
level. Furthermore, for 10% of the industries, the information at the 3-digit SIC level is not available,
so we impute it by the mean value at the 2-digit SIC level.
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3.4.3.3 Price rigidity
We construct price rigidity at the industry level based on estimates from Petrella and
Santoro (2012). The authors consider sector specific New Keynesian Philips Curve
(NKPC) to back-out the degree of price rigidity at the industry. They evaluate alter-
native proxies for marginal costs and different specifications of sectoral NKPC. We
construct price rigidity at the industry as an average of the implied price adjustment
probabilities based on the intermediate input share as a proxy for marginal costs,
which fits best their model predictions.²⁹
3.4.3.4 Financial frictions
Industries differ, due to the nature of the product, on the length of the production
process, estimated time until cash from revenues realizes, among others. These differ-
ences affect plant’s liquidity and borrowing needs, and consequently, its vulnerability
to financial frictions.
Following Raddatz (2006), we construct measures of liquidity needs as the
industry-level median ratio of inventories to sales, and labor costs to sales.³⁰ These
variables capture the share of inventory investments or labor costs which can be com-
monly financed by revenues. As larger the values, higher is the need to rely on exter-
nal sources to cover the expenditures. In principle, the constructed ratios may not be
entirely technological. For example, businesses may opt to accumulate liquid assets
to avoid financial dependence. To circumvent this problem, we follow the literature
and construct the measures using information from publicly traded U.S. companies.
The underlying assumption is that observed industry differences at these large pub-
licly traded companies is not driven by the supply of credit, which is considered to
be perfectly elastic.
²⁹We do not consider the estimated price adjustment probabilities which are inconsistent with the
theory. That is, we ignore those estimates where the implied probability is above one or below zero.
For those industries with missing information of price rigidity, we impute their values based on the
average price rigidity at the 3-digit SIC level.
³⁰We consider only those industries with at least 5 firms at the industry. Given that we lack of
sufficiently information at the 4-digit SIC level, we compute the indicators at the 3-digit SIC level.
Furthermore, for 10% of the industries, the information at the 3-digit SIC level is not available, so we
impute it by the mean value at the 2-digit SIC level.
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We complement our index with the share of employment at young firms (below 5
years old) at the industry. There is ample evidence which associates larger borrowing
costs at young businesses, as they have higher degree of idiosyncratic risk, lower
amount of collateral, and weaker credit records.³¹
3.4.3.5 Summary
Table 3.2 describes the variables we use to measure industry-level frictions. To cre-
ate these indexes, we consider the average from the standarized variables, and we
further standarize the index itself.³² We are able to construct the indicators for 443
manufacturing industries. Table 3.3 presents the correlations between the indexes.
On the one hand, industries with larger capital adjustment costs are associated with
larger labor adjustment costs. On the other hand, industries with higher vulnerability
to financial conditions are commonly related with lower factor adjustment frictions.
³¹ The literature used size of the business as alternative indicator for access to credit and tightness
of the borrowing constraint. However, there is recent evidence which suggests that financial frictions
do not lead to different business dynamics across firm size, once controlling by the age of the firm.
See for example Hurst and Pugsley (2011), Dyrda (2015), and Fort et al. (2013).
³²As alternative method, we construct the first principal component. Our main findings are robust
to this specification, see Appendix 3.A.4.2.
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Table 3.2. Variables reflecting frictions at the industry level
Variable Description Source
Labor frictions index
Share of full time workers Share of employees working full-time (35 hours or more) at the
industry (average)
March CPS: 1970-2011
Unionization Share of workers affiliated to labor unions at the industry (average) March CPS: 1990-2011
Kurtosis employment growth Kurtosis of the net employment growth distribution. Net
employment growth defined as Li t+1−Li t0.5∗(Li t+Li t+1)
Compustat: 1968-2006
Capital frictions index
Structure intensity Structures relative to equipment at the industry (average) NBER-CES Manufacturing:
1958-2011
Skewness gross investment Skewness of the gross investment rate distribution. Investment rates
defined at the firm as Ii t0.5∗(Ki t+Ki t+1)
Compustat: 1968-2006
Kurtosis gross investment Kurtosis of the gross investment rate distribution. Investment rates
defined at the firm as Ii t0.5∗(Ki t+Ki t+1)
Compustat: 1968-2006
Price rigidity index
Price adjustment probability Based on the estimation of industry level New Keynesian Phillips
curves
Petrella & Santoro (2012)
Financial frictions index
Inventory cost share Industry-level median of inventories over sales Compustat: 1968-2006
Labor cost share Industry-level median of labor costs over sales Compustat: 1968-2006
Employment share at young firms Average share of employment at young firms (below 5 years old) Quarterly Workforce Indicators:
2000-2013
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Table 3.3. Correlation between indexes
Labor index Capital index Price index
Capital index .268∗∗∗
Price index -.022 −.03
Financial index −.311∗∗∗ −.083∗ 0.087∗
Notes: This table presents pairwise correlations between the indexes. See
Table 3.2 for for a detail description of the industry indexes. Significance:
1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Response to uncertainty shocks
We estimate industry-level impulse responses based on quarterly data from 1972Q2 to
2013Q4. As the information is at quarterly frequency, we use four lags in our VAR system.
In order to account for the potential differences that may arise from joining the series from
Davis et al. (1998) with QWI (see Section 3.4.1), we include a step dummy which takes the
value of one from 2000Q2 onwards, and zero otherwise. Furthermore, we allow for different
time trends at the first panel (1972-1998) and second panel (2000-2013).
We start by characterizing the effects of an uncertainty shock on aggregate job flows. As
described in Section 3.3, each model contains, as common variables, the stock-market level,
uncertainty, and the aggregate job flows. Figure 3.3 displays the effects of an uncertainty
shock on aggregate job flows based on this subsystem.
An uncertainty shock significantly decrease aggregate job creation and rise aggregate job
destruction. These effects are not in line with the predictions based on a model with labor
adjustment costs, see Section 3.2.1. In other words, we do not find supporting evidence of
labor adjustment frictions as a transmission mechanism through which uncertainty affects
job flows.
3.5.2 Through which channel uncertainty shocks affects
employment?
To answer this question, we follow the econometric approach from Davis and Haltiwanger
(2001), and regress the cumulative impulse responses from each industry on cubic polynomi-
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Figure 3.3. Impulse response functions: Aggregate job flows
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Notes: Impulse responses of aggregate job creation and job destruction given a three standard deviation uncertainty
shock. Shaded area denotes 90% confidence interval, computed following a block bootstrap approach as Kilian and Kim
(2009).
als in labor, capital, price, and financial index. We focus on the cumulative responses from the
first year horizon, and report in Appendix 3.A.4.4 the results based on alternative horizons.
To begin with, Figure 3.4 summarizes the estimated cumulative responses of job flows to
an uncertainty shock for all industries. For more than 80% of the industries, an unexpected
rise of uncertainty leads to more jobs destroyed and less jobs created. As our previous finding,
this result does not support labor adjustment costs as an important channel through which
uncertainty affects job flows.
Figure 3.4. Cumulative response to an uncertainty shock: 4-digit industries
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Notes: Cumulative response of job flows based on the first year horizon, given a three standard deviation uncertainty
shock. The upper left quadrant contains 80% of the industries. Marker size represents the size of the industry relative to
the aggregate employment in manufacturing in United States.
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Figure 3.5 provides the fitted relationship between the cumulative job flow responses
and each friction, while evaluating the remaining variables at the median.
Given our previous empirical findings, it remains to understand the role of capital, price,
and financial frictions. We do not find supporting evidence of capital frictions and price rigidi-
ties as channels throughwhich uncertainty affects job flows.While the share of jobs destroyed
declines with the size of capital frictions at the industry, there is no significant relation be-
tween the decline in job creation and the size of capital adjustment frictions. Similarly, the
relation between price rigidity and industry-level job flow responses is almost flat.
On the contrary, financial vulnerability seems to play an important role for explaining the
effects of uncertainty shocks. As higher the vulnerability to financial conditions, stronger the
response of job flows from an uncertainty shock. The effect is sizable. Industries associated
to be most vulnerable to financial conditions (top quintile) report 75% stronger job flow
responses than the least vulnerable industries (bottom quintile).
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Figure 3.5. Cumulative response to a macro uncertainty shock conditional on industry indexes
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Notes: Regressions are based on the industry-level cumulative response (first year horizon) given a three standard deviation macro uncer-
tainty shock. We regress this variable as a function of a cubic polynomial of all industry indexes jointly. The predicted response is constructed
allowing the indicated industry index to vary, while evaluating the remaining industry indexes at the median. Shaded areas denotes 90%
confidence interval. We weight industry-level cumulative responses by the estimated absolute effect at the industry relative to the standard
deviation of the estimate.
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Table 3.4. Cumulative response to an uncertainty shock conditional on quintile indexes
Job creation Job destruction
Bottom Top Bottom Top
Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile
Labor frictions index -0.64 -0.75 0.49 0.85
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Capital frictions index -0.55 -0.60 0.68 0.54
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Price rigidity index -0.70 -0.70 0.66 0.62
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Financial frictions index -0.45 -0.61 0.26 0.64
(0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
Notes: Regressions are based on the industry-level cumulative response (first year
horizon) given a three standard deviation uncertainty shock. We regress this variable
as a function of a cubic polynomial of all industry indexes jointly. The predicted re-
sponse is constructed allowing the indicated industry index to vary, while evaluating
the remaining industry indexes at the median. Bottom (Top) quintile: Predicted job
flows at the first (fifth) quintile of the industry index distribution. Standard errors in
parenthesis.
3.5.3 Controlling for additional shocks
We assess whether our findings are robust if we consider a richer VAR system which allows
us to further control for monetary and fiscal shocks. We augment our baseline specification
with monetary and fiscal shocks identified through narrative approaches. For the former, we
include the series of shocks identified by Coibion et al. (2012), while for the latter we consider
the series from Mertens and Ravn (2014). Given data availability, the analysis is limited until
2006Q4.
We place the tax and monetary shocks first in the recursive ordering. Further, we include
additional restrictions at A(L):
ai, jc(l) = ai, jd = 0, ∀l and i = m, x , s,u, a jc, a jd
where m denote the monetary policy shock and x the tax shock series, identified through
narrative approaches.
Figures 3.6 and 3.7 provide the results from this exercise. For more than 60% of the in-
dustries, an uncertainty shock leads to more jobs destroyed and less jobs created. Further,
the relation between the cumulative job flows responses and financial vulnerability is even
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stronger than our baseline results. Industries with the highest vulnerability to financial fric-
tions are associated with 150% stronger job flow responses relative to the least vulnerable
industries.
Figure 3.6. Cumulative response to an uncertainty shock: Controlling for monetary and fiscal
shocks
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Notes: Cumulative response of job flows based on the first year horizon, given a three standard deviation uncertainty
shock. The upper left quadrant contains 60% of the industries. Marker size represents the size of the industry relative to
the aggregate employment in manufacturing in United States.
In Appendix 3.A.4, we show that our empirical findings are robust whether we consider
alternative horizons for the cumulative responses or use financial uncertainty as an alterna-
tive proxy of uncertainty. We also show that our findings hold if we focus exclusively on the
series based on the first sample (1972-1998) or second sample (2000-2013).
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Figure 3.7. Cumulative response to a macro uncertainty shock conditional on industry indexes: Controlling for monetary and fiscal
shocks
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Notes: Regressions are based on the industry-level cumulative response (first year horizon) given a three standard deviation uncertainty
shock. We regress this variable as a function of a cubic polynomial of all industry indexes jointly. The predicted response is constructed al-
lowing the indicated industry index to vary, while evaluating the remaining industry indexes at the median. Shaded areas denotes 90%
confidence interval. We weight industry-level cumulative responses by the estimated absolute effect at the industry relative to the standard
deviation of the estimate.
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3.6 Conclusion
This paper assess whether factor adjustment frictions, price rigidities, or financial frictions are
important transmission mechanisms through which uncertainty shocks affects the economy.
Using job flows data at the industry level over the period 1972-2013 in United States, we
find that an uncertainty shock leads to more jobs destroyed and less jobs created for about
80% of the industries. The magnitude of these responses are particularly stronger as higher
is the degree of vulnerability to financial conditions at the industry. On the contrary, we do
not find supportive evidence of factor adjustment frictions or price rigidities as important
channels of uncertainty shocks in the economy.
Our work highlights the importance of financial frictions as an important channel through
which uncertainty affects the economy. One interesting avenue for further research would be
to understand whether government policies can ameliorate the effects of uncertainty shocks
in an economy with financial frictions, and whether these government interventions would
be socially desirable.
Appendix 3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Computation
To solve the models, we discretize the state space. For the exogenous demand process z,
we approximate it with 19 grid points with a Tauchen algorithm which takes into account
time-varying volatility (see Bloom et al. (2014)). Furthermore, for the model with labor ad-
justment frictions, we choose 1000 log-linear grids points for labor. Similarly, in the model
with capital adjustment frictions, we consider 1000 log-spaced grids with respect to depre-
ciation. In the model with price rigidities, we further discretize the exogenous aggregate
price process P with 15 grid points, applying again a Tauchen algorithm, and consider 900
log-spaced grid points for the price of the plant. Finally, for the financial frictions model, as
the state space of the problem is relatively more complex with respect to the other dynamic
problems, we consider a lower amount of grid points for the demand process. In particular,
we approximate the demand process with 16 grid points, and consider 40 log-spaced grid
points for labor, and 48 equidistant grid points for debt. We solve the models using value
function iteration.
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3.A.2 Model solution: Financial frictions
In order to numerically solve the model with financial frictions in Section 3.2.4 we consider
the following steps:
1. Guess the price for the bond the value of the plant.
2. Given the bond price, calculate the value function using value function iteration.
3. Using the updated value function, construct the default function and update the bond
price.
4. Based on the updated bond price, return to point 1 until the price of the bond conver-
gences.
3.A.3 Data description
We use a concordance table provided by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) to
connect the disaggregated information at the 4-digit 1987 SIC level from Davis et al. (1998)
with the data series from QWI which is disaggregated at 4-digit 2007 NAICS level.³³ This
table allows us to map industry codes using weights, which links the share of employment
at the SIC level which corresponds to an industry in NAICS. Yet, before proceeding with this
concordance, we need to conduct some adjustments.
First, the available concordance between SIC and NAICS is based on the 1997 NAICS.
Therefore, we translate 6-digit 2007 NAICS into 6-digit 1997 NAICS using the table given by
US Census Bureau at http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/concordances/concordances.
html. Second, we adjust the concordance table from the 6-digit NAICS level to the 4-digit
NAICS level, and re-compute the weights from SIC into NAICS based on the share of employ-
ment of the 6-digit NAICS industry at the 4-digit NAICS level. At the end, we are able to map
all industry-level job flows from NAICS with the data from Davis et al. (1998).
3.A.4 Robustness
3.A.4.1 Job flow responses from a financial uncertainty shock
Figures 3.8 and Table 3.5 show the effect of uncertainty shocks on job flows when using
financial uncertainty as a proxy for uncertainty. Ludvigson et al. (2015) make a distinction
³³ The table can be access at http://www.nber.org/nberprod/.
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between macroeconomic and financial uncertainty where the latter seems to have larger
negative impact on real economic activity. Yet, the quantitative effect on job flows and its
relation with the industry indexes are remarkably similar to our baseline results, when using
as a proxy macroeconomic uncertainty.
Figure 3.8. Impulse response functions given a financial uncertainty shock: Aggregate job
flows
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Notes: Impulse responses of aggregate job creation and job destruction given a three standard deviation uncertainty
shock. Shaded area denotes 90% confidence interval, which is computed following a block bootstrap approach as Kilian
and Kim (2009).
3.A.4.2 Results based on the first principal component
In the following, we show that our main results are robust if we consider an alternative
method to construct the indexes at the industry-level. In particular, we construct the indexes
as the first principal component of the variables which corresponds to each index.
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Table 3.5. Cumulative response to a financial uncertainty shock conditional on quintile
indexes
Job creation Job destruction
Bottom Top Bottom Top
Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile
Labor frictions index -0.63 -0.65 0.50 0.73
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Capital frictions index -0.59 -0.58 0.64 0.52
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Price rigidity index -0.61 -0.63 0.60 0.57
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
Financial frictions index -0.52 -0.64 0.22 0.57
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
Notes: Regressions are based on the industry-level cumulative response (first year
horizon) given a three standard deviation uncertainty shock. We regress this variable
as a function of a cubic polynomial of all industry indexes jointly. The predicted re-
sponse is constructed allowing the indicated industry index to vary, while evaluating
the remaining industry indexes at the median. Bottom (Top) quintile: Predicted job
flows at the first (fifth) quintile of the industry index distribution. Standard errors in
parenthesis.
3.A.4.3 Effects from uncertainty shocks in the first and second sample of analysis
We explore whether our findings hold if we focus on the first sample of analysis (1972-1998),
see Figures 3.9 and Table 3.7, and second sample of analysis (2000-2013), see Figures 3.10
and 3.7. While the samples differ in regards to the quantitative effect of uncertainty shocks,
as higher the vulnerability to financial frictions, stronger is the effect of uncertainty shocks
on job flows at both series.
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Table 3.6. Cumulative response to an uncertainty shock conditional on quintile indexes
(principal component)
Job creation Job destruction
Bottom Top Bottom Top
Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile
Labor frictions index -0.70 -0.77 0.52 0.86
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Capital frictions index -0.52 -0.60 0.65 0.58
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Price rigidity index -0.71 -0.72 0.66 0.62
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Financial frictions index -0.48 -0.62 0.25 0.66
(0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
Notes: Regressions are based on the industry-level cumulative response (first year
horizon) given a three standard deviation uncertainty shock. We regress this variable
as a function of a cubic polynomial of all industry indexes jointly. Industry indexes
are constructed as a function of the first principal component of the variables at the
industry-level. The predicted response is constructed allowing the indicated industry
index to vary, while evaluating the remaining industry indexes at the median. Bottom
(Top) quintile: Predicted job flows at the first (fifth) quintile of the industry index dis-
tribution. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Figure 3.9. Impulse response functions: Aggregate job flows (Sample 1972-1998)
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Notes: Impulse responses of aggregate job creation and job destruction given a three standard deviation uncertainty
shock. Shaded area denotes 90% confidence interval, which is computed following a block bootstrap approach as Kilian
and Kim (2009).
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Table 3.7. Cumulative response to an uncertainty shock conditional on quintile indexes:
Sample 1972-1998
Job creation Job destruction
Bottom Top Bottom Top
Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile
Labor frictions index -0.58 -0.70 0.33 0.86
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Capital frictions index -0.55 -0.67 0.68 0.51
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Price rigidity index -0.71 -0.70 0.57 0.51
(0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Financial frictions index -0.31 -0.56 0.12 0.57
(0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06)
Notes: Regressions are based on the industry-level cumulative response (first year
horizon) given a three standard deviation uncertainty shock. We regress this variable
as a function of a cubic polynomial of all industry indexes jointly. The predicted re-
sponse is constructed allowing the indicated industry index to vary, while evaluating
the remaining industry indexes at the median. Bottom (Top) quintile: Predicted job
flows at the first (fifth) quintile of the industry index distribution. Standard errors in
parenthesis.
Figure 3.10. Impulse response functions: Aggregate job flows (Sample 2000-2013)
-
.
2
-
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
 
%
-c
ha
ng
e
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
 
Quarters after the shock
Jobs Created
-
.
4
-
.
2
0
.
2
 
%
-c
ha
ng
e
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
 
Quarters after the shock
Jobs Destroyed
Notes: Impulse responses of aggregate job creation and job destruction given a three standard deviation uncertainty
shock. Shaded area denotes 90% confidence interval, which is computed following a block bootstrap approach as Kilian
and Kim (2009).
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Table 3.8. Cumulative response to an uncertainty shock conditional on quintile indexes:
Sample 2000-2013
Job creation Job destruction
Bottom Top Bottom Top
Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile
Labor frictions index -0.31 -0.42 0.40 0.50
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Capital frictions index -0.42 -0.33 0.47 0.37
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Price rigidity index -0.36 -0.29 0.42 0.40
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Financial frictions index -0.28 -0.31 0.20 0.41
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
Notes: Regressions are based on the industry-level cumulative response (first year
horizon) given a three standard deviation uncertainty shock. We regress this variable
as a function of a cubic polynomial of all industry indexes jointly. The predicted re-
sponse is constructed allowing the indicated industry index to vary, while evaluating
the remaining industry indexes at the median. Bottom (Top) quintile: Predicted job
flows at the first (fifth) quintile of the industry index distribution. Standard errors in
parenthesis.
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3.A.4.4 Alternative horizons: Cumulative job flow responses
Figure 3.11. Cumulative response to a macro uncertainty shock conditional on industry idexes: Alternative horizons of cumulative
responses
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Notes: Regressions are based on the industry-level cumulative response of two (dashed line), four (solid line), and six quarter (dashed-dot
line) horizon, given a three standard deviation macro uncertainty shock. We regress this variable as a function of a cubic polynomial of all
industry indexes jointly. The predicted response is constructed allowing the indicated industry index to vary, while evaluating the remain-
ing industry indexes at the median. Shaded areas denotes 90% confidence interval. We weight industry-level cumulative responses by the
estimated absolute effect at the industry relative to the standard deviation of the estimate.).
4Wage Risk, Employment Risk and the
Rise in Wage Inequality
Joint with Felix Wellschmied
4.1 Introduction
Individuals face substantial idiosyncratic earnings uncertainty in the labor market.¹ Whether
this risk has changed over the last decades is a key question to comprehend changes in earn-
ings inequality, the welfare costs of incomplete markets, and to appropriately redesign the
welfare state. Yet, no consensus has been reached.²
In this study, we quantify trends in labor market risks over the last three decades in
the US. We estimate risk resulting from idiosyncratic shocks to a worker’s productivity that
change his market wage irrespective of his current job. Moreover, we identify the risk arising
from different jobs paying heterogeneous wages for the same worker. In the presence of
search frictions, a worker is not able to locate the highest paying job instantaneously, implying
a risk component arising from job search. The distinction between productivity and a job
component is pertinent from the worker perspective. A worker may choose exiting the labor
market when his idiosyncratic skills are suddenly less demanded. On the contrary, when
facing a specific job offer, a worker has the option to accept it or to stay with his current job.
¹ For early contributions see Lillard and Willis (1978), Lillard and Weiss (1979) and MaCurdy
(1982).
² Early studies like Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994), Blundell et al. (2008), and Heathcote et al.
(2010b) find income uncertainty to have increased. Recent evidence by CBO (2007) and Guvenen
et al. (2014) do not find such secular trends.
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Different from the existing empirical literature on trends in labor market risk, we disen-
tangle these endogenous choices from the shocks that triggered them. As Low et al. (2010)
and Altonji et al. (2013), we uncover the true variances of shocks from observed wage
changes by explicitly modeling participation and job-mobility decisions as reaction to these
shocks. The amount of endogenous selection of workers upon shocks depends on the distri-
bution of worker types and the institutional setting. Both of these changed considerably since
the 1980’s in the US; the share of workers with weak labor market attachment has grown, and
the welfare state became more generous in many instances (see Ben-Shalom et al. (2011)).
To account for these changes, we allow the amount of selection in the data to have secular
trends of its own.
Using panel data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) for males
over the period 1983-2013, we find that differentiating between different types of risk and
accounting for selection is important. While observed quarterly wage volatility is close to con-
stant over time, the standard deviation of permanent risk has increased between 16 and 30
percent, depending on workers’ education.³ Moreover, heterogeneity in job offers increased
over time for workers with at least some college education. On the contrary, this dispersion
decreased for workers with at most high school education, particularly, when changing ca-
reers.
To quantify the role that these changes in risk play in explaining rising wage inequal-
ity and their consequences for social welfare, we simulate the estimated risk in a structural
partial equilibrium model of life-time utility maximization. Workers’ productivity evolves
stochastically, and workers search for jobs, on and off the job, paying heterogeneous wages
for a given productivity level. Utility for leisure and precautionary savings provide partial in-
surance against uncertainty arising from job offers and productivity. Additionally, our model
puts emphasis on the insurance provided by the government and the resulting employment
decisions. Workers have access to unemployment insurance, a means-tested program, dis-
ability insurance, and social security. Furthermore, the government runs a progressive tax
schedule. We find the model provides a good fit of key data moments given the estimated
wage process. Moreover, it features selection into employment and across jobs consistent with
our data estimates. When simulating the increase in estimated risk, the model can account
³We find a declining trend in transitory wage innovations, yet, this may reflect changes in mea-
surement error.
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for 85% of the increase in within group wage inequality in United States during the last three
decades.⁴
Other papers which use structural models of the labor market to understand trends in
wage inequality are Bowlus and Robin (2004), who permit for trends in wage promotions and
demotion rates, Flabbi and Leonardi (2010), who consider trends in labor market transitions
and job heterogeneity, and Leonardi (2015), who models changes to the dispersion of match
specific productivity shocks. Our model differs from this literature by explicitly modeling a
rich set of governmental programs, workers selecting into these, and by allowing jointly for
productivity and wage offer risk.
We find that those dimensions are important to comprehend the welfare effects of chang-
ing labor market risk. The overall welfare costs of rising wage uncertainty are small. An
unborn worker is willing to pay 0.23% of life-time consumption to avoid the increase in risk.
This is in contrast to the large welfare costs of changed income risk found in Heathcote et al.
(2010a). We differ in three main aspects. First, our estimated increase of permanent produc-
tivity risk is significantly smaller than theirs. Second, workers with higher educational degree
compensate an increase of permanent risk with more dispersed job offers. These workers are
willing to pay between 0.25% and 0.32% of life time consumption for an 0.01 increase in
the standard deviation of job offers. The intuition is simple. In a search model, a rise in the
dispersion of job offers creates an option value to the worker: Particular poor jobs terminate
early because search allows the worker to find a better job. Third, we find the government
plays a crucial role in insuring workers. Welfare losses from changing wage risk would be
about five times larger when the government provides only social security.
Using small increases in the welfare state as counterfactual experiments, we ask whether
the welfare state present in the 1980s was efficient in insuring workers against labor mar-
ket risk. Consistent with Chetty (2006), we find that the complementarity of employment
and consumption is quantitatively low, therefore, our model favors programs with low em-
ployment disencentive effects. Consequently, an increase in unemployment benefits reduces
welfare, but an increase in universal means-tested transfers leads to a moderate welfare gain.
The latter program provides insurance against persistent wage losses, but has only moder-
ate employment disincentives. Autor and Duggan (2006) show that eligibility requirements
for disability insurance were weakened over the last decades, and this threatens its financial
⁴We concentrate on the rise of within group wage inequality, which explains most of the rise in
total residual inequality (see Krueger and Perri (2006)). We see our paper as complement to the
literature focusing on between group inequality. This includes a rising college premium (Katz and
Autor (1999)) and skill biased technological change (Katz and Murphy (1992)).
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soundness. We find that such a weakening implies substantial welfare losses. The losses occur
because disability insurance provides incentives for elderly workers with poor past outcomes
to quit the workforce.
The structure of the paper continues as follows: The next section specifies our economet-
ric model, discusses identification, and presents the results of changing wage uncertainty
over time. The following section presents our life-cycle model, discuses the implications of
changing wage uncertainty for wage inequality and discuses its welfare implications. The
last section concludes.
4.2 Estimating Changes in Risk
4.2.1 Identification of Risk and Selection
Workers differ in their amount of log human capital ui t , which follows a random walk with
exogenous innovations εi t ∼ N(0,σ2ε). These shocks contain promotion decisions, health
shocks, and any other changes in the market value of a worker’s skills. In addition to human
capital, wages depend on a log job component ψi j , which stays constant for the duration of
the job. Our framework allows us to be silent about the source of this job component. It may
arise from different firms paying different wages, or from an individual match component
between the worker and the firm. Within a quarter, workers may receive up to one outside
job offer from a wage offer distribution. Outside offer draws are random across time with
ψi j ∼ N(0,σ2ψ). Consequently, the real log wage of individual i working at job j at time t is
given by
wi j t = β x i t + ψi j + ui t + ei t (4.1)
ui t = ui t−1 + εi t
ei t = X (q)ιi t ,
where x i t is a vector of worker observables, and ei t is a transitory component, which follows
an MA(q) process with ιi t ∼ N(0,σ2ι ). The latter may be true temporary wage shocks, such as
bonuses, or measurement error in the data. Given his newly realized human capital, current
job component, and possible outside offer, an individual decides each quarter whether to
work and, conditional on working, whether to move to another job. The focus of this paper is
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on the dispersion of ε andψ. For tractability, we assume that workers do not select on purely
transitory shocks which may lead to a wrong inference of their size.⁵
The above representation embraces a large class of search models, yet, it is instructive
to discuss the key assumptions. First, we assume a time invariant job component which is in
line with on-the-job search models following Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and empirical
specifications following Abowd et al. (1999). Relatedly, Guiso et al. (2005) show that firms
almost perfectly insure workers against idiosyncratic firm risk, supporting our assumption.
However, in the presence of some commitment device on the firm side, wages may be back
loaded within a job with stable productivity (see Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), and Burdett
and Coles (2003)). Yet, Low et al. (2010) find that a model of stochastic job component fits
the data worse than amodel with a stochastic human capital component.⁶ Second, we assume
human capital to follow a random walk process, in line with a large empirical literature
on earnings uncertainty.⁷ Recently, Guvenen et al. (2015) show that estimating an AR(1)
mixture model of highly persistent and more transitory shocks helps to match the kurtosis
and skewness present in earnings growth data. Extending our model including this process is
beyond the scope of this paper. Given our decomposition of wages, we require that the excess
kurtosis is not estimated as large variance of the permanent shock. We trim the distribution of
wage growth and find that only the variance from transitory shocks is significantly affected.⁸
Taking first differences of Equation 4.1 yields individual wage growth:
∆wi j t = β∆x i t + [ψi j − ψi j−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
ξi t
]Mi t + εi t + ∆ei t , (4.2)
where Mi t is an indicator variable equal to one when the worker changes his job between t
and t − 1. Central to our approach, observed wage growth realizations result from endoge-
nous labor market participation and job mobility decisions. Naturally, these decisions depend
on the worker’s current wage prospects, as well as the shock to his human capital and outside
offers. We model these decisions using latent variables for participation in the current and
⁵We assume a MA(2) process for transitory shocks ei t . Consequently, we identify this component
from the autocovariance function of wage growth up to lag three. The estimated results are robust to
alternative order specifications for the MA process.
⁶Along this line, Flinn and Mabli (2008), Hagedorn and Manovskii (2010), and Tjaden and
Wellschmied (2014) show some counter-factual implications of wage back loading.
⁷ See, for example, Abowd and Card (1989), Topel (1991), Topel and Ward (1992), Meghir and
Pistaferri (2004) and Low et al. (2010).
⁸Heathcote et al. (2010b) find the same phenomenon in PSID data.
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previous period, and job mobility:
P∗i t−1 = αzi t−1 + pii t−1, Pi t−1 = 1

P∗i t−1 > 0
	
, (4.3)
P∗i t = αzi t + pii t , Pi t = 1

P∗i t > 0
	
, (4.4)
M∗i t = θκi t + µi t , Mi t = 1

M∗i t > 0
	
, (4.5)
where zi t and κi t are worker observables, and pii t and µi t are unobservables. The unobserv-
able components contain, among other things, the unobserved human capital, its innovations
εi t , and the job componentψi j . To account for the arising correlation between the unobserv-
ables, we extend the framework of Low et al. (2010) and assume: pii t−1pii t
µi t
 ∼ N

 00
0
 ,
 1 ρpipi−1 ρpiµρpipi−1 1 ρpi−1µ
ρpiµ ρpi−1µ 1

 .
We estimate Equations 4.3-4.5 together with the covariance matrix using a nested trivariate
probit, taking into account that mobility is only observed conditional on the individual having
worked the current and previous quarter.⁹
Similar to a standard Heckit model, we use exclusion restrictions, discussed below, to
obtain unbiased estimates of unexplained wage growth:¹⁰
gi t = ∆wi t − β∆x i t = ξi tMi t + εi t + ∆X (q)ιi t . (4.6)
Resulting from the participation andmobility decisions, the distribution of observed resid-
ual wage growth is truncated; we do not observe all shocks to productivity and the job compo-
nent. Given the structure of our problem, residual wage growth follows a truncated multivari-
ate normal distribution, which first two moments are derived in generic form by Manjunath
and Wilhelm (2012).¹¹ To provide some intuition for identification, denote the correlation
between permanent wage shocks and the unobserved component of participation byρεpi, and
the correlation between the former and the unobserved component of mobility by ρεµ. Fur-
ther, define ρξpi, ρξpi−1 and ρξµ to be the correlation between changes in the job component
and shocks to participation this period, last period, and mobility, respectively. Summarize
⁹We compute the multivariate normal probabilities using simulated maximum likelihood methods
as in Cappellari and Jenkins (2006).
¹⁰Appendix 4.A.1 derives the appropriate selection term.
¹¹Appendix 4.A.1 derives the moments for our particular case.
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the results from the probit by the vector X i t = [αzi t ,αzi t−1,θκi t ,ρpipi−1 ,ρµpi,ρµpi−1], then
the first moments of unexplained wage growth in implicit form are given by
E(gi t |Pi t = Pi t−1 = 1,Mi t = 0) = ρεpiσεφ(−zi tα) f1(X i t) − ρεµσεφ(θκi t) f2(X i t)
E(gi t |Pi t = Pi t−1 = 1,Mi t = 1) = σε

ρεpiφ(−zi tα) f3(X i t) + ρεµφ(−κi tθ) f4(X i t)

+ σξ

ρpiξφ(−zi tα) f5(X i t) + ρµξφ(−κi tθ) f6(X i t) + ρpii t−1ξφ(−zi t−1α) f7(X i t)

,
where φ is the PDF of the standard normal distribution and fx are functions that we show
in closed form in Appendix 4.A.1. The first moments identify the correlations between wage
innovations with mobility and participation decisions, up to the scalars σε and σξ. Identi-
fication results from comparing unexplained wage growth of individuals with different par-
ticipation and mobility probabilities. Abstracting for the moment from measurement error,
the second moments of unexplained wage growth achieve joint identification of σε, σξ, and
selection correlations. Accounting for selection, the variance of wage growth of job stayers,
E(g2i t |Pi t = Pi t−1 = 1,Mi t = 0), is sufficient to identify σε. Moreover, the variance of wage
growth of job switchers, corrected for selection, identifies σξ. Finally, the combination of
these four moments, together with the autocovariance function of wage growth, allows us to
identify all parameters of interest.
4.2.2 Data Sources and Sample Selection
Our analysis of labor market risk requires individual longitudinal information on wages and
worker and job characteristics over several decades. The dataset most adequate for these
requirements is the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). It provides a set of
panels covering the period of 1983-2013.¹² Every 4 month (defined as a wave) the Census
conducts an interview with all adult members of participating households, asking them about
their work and household characteristics during the preceding 4 months. In order to account
for the seam-bias effect generated by the recollection period, we aggregate the monthly in-
formation to quarterly observations. One concern regarding the data is that the quality from
the survey changed over time. We describe the details of our data cleaning procedure in Ap-
pendix 4.A.2, where we also show that survey redesigns are unlikely to have an impact on
our main results.
¹²We exploit all up to date surveys, except of the survey from 1985 and 1989: 1984, 1986, 1987,
1988, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008. We do not these two surveys due to the absence
of information regarding work experience, which is used at our estimation strategy.
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We group the data into three major time periods, such that each covers years of expan-
sion and recession: 1983-1993, 1994-2003, and 2004-2013. For the analysis, we consider
three education groups based on the maximum attainable degree level: high school, college
dropouts, and college graduates or higher education.¹³ Furthermore, we focus on working-
age male individuals, aged between 25 and 61, who are not self-employed, enrolled in school,
in the armed forces, or recalled by their previous firm after a separation.¹⁴
Given the aggregation of the information at quarterly frequency, we need to establish
some definitions with respect to employment and job-mobility at this frequency level. We
consider a worker employed within a quarter, when he spends most weeks of the quarter
working. We identify different jobs by the establishment ID assigned by SIPP.¹⁵ We define a
worker’s main job based on the establishment ID with the highest earnings.¹⁶ Whenever the
main job changes from one quarter to the other, we count this worker as a job mover. Thus,
mobility may result from job changes that occur either via a non-employment or without a
non-employment spell.¹⁷ For each quarter, we compute hourly wages as total earnings over
total hours worked at the main job. To make the results robust to outliers, we do not consider
individuals with hourly wage growth below the 1st percentile (above the 99th percentile) of
the hourly wage growth distribution by education, period, and job mobility status.
4.2.3 Empirical Results
4.2.3.1 Probit Results
We estimate the model for each of our three periods and education degrees separately;
thereby, we allow for time varying returns to human capital and time varying patterns in
participation and mobility. In order to estimate the participation probability, we control for
a quadratic in age and work experience, race, marital status, indicators whether a person
¹³ In specific, we group individuals into workers with at most high school education (high school),
workers with some college and excluding individuals who received an associate degree (college
dropouts), and workers who received an associate degree, college or higher (college degree).
¹⁴We choose the sample to start at age 25 to assure that college graduates fully transit to the labor
market. Workers being recalled posses a search technology not well represented by our model.
¹⁵Our choice implies that we interpret within establishment changes in occupation as productivity
shock and not as a change in the job component.
¹⁶ The survey reports at most two jobs per month for each individual. In case an individual holds
more than two jobs, the two jobs with most hours worked are reported.
¹⁷ For identification, we require that skill depreciation for unemployment less than one quarter is
negligible. Based on our employment definition, a worker with a mobility can have spend at most 2
months in unemployment.
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lives in a metropolitan area or reports being disable, the unemployment rate at the state
level, and time and region fixed effects.¹⁸ Importantly, we require a set of regressors that
identify selection. That is, variables affecting the decision to particpate or move jobs, but not
independently related to εi t and ξi t . For this purpose, we augment the set of explanatory
variables including unearned household income, an index of generosity of the welfare system
(state-level unemployment insurance), and an indicator whether the worker owns a house.¹⁹
Additionally, we include industry and occupation fixed effects to estimate the probability
to move jobs.²⁰ We present the results of the probits in Appendix 4.A.4. As expected, high un-
employment benefits, high unearned income, and not owning a house reduce the probability
to be employed. The theoretical effects on mobility are ambiguous. In principle, being closer
to the participation margin should increase mobility because workers are more likely to quit
their current job. On the other hand, higher reservation wages limit the possibility of future
mobility. We find that state level generosity and house ownership reduce the likelihood of a
worker to move jobs. In this respect, we do not find significant effects of unearned household
income.
The amount of workers close to the participation and mobility margin is key for the
severeness of workers selecting on shocks. We observe substantial changes along this margins
over the decades under analysis. In particular, when comparing the third period with respect
to the first, employed workers have relatively lower participation probabilities, with more
workers in the lower tail of the distribution. Moreover, workers have higher probabilities to
change jobs. When decomposing effects, we find that observable worker characteristics have
shifted in the direction of workers with less stable jobs (singles, minorities, elderly), and the
marginal effects of these covariates have also changed.
¹⁸ The survey provides, in addition, information regarding tenure at the job. Yet, the share of obser-
vations with reported zero values conditional on working is above 30%. Moreover, tenure information
is not available for all jobs before the 1996 panel. Consequently, we opt not to use this variable for
our analysis.
¹⁹As our study, Low et al. (2010) considers unearned household income and state-level unemploy-
ment insurance as exclusion restrictions in their estimation. For these exclusion restrictions to be valid
we require that unemployment insurance payments do not affect wage growth through bargaining.
In respect of the housing exclusion restriction, the literature considers it a predictors of job mobility
while not affecting directly wage growth (see for example Blanchflower and Oswald (2013), Bowen
and Finegan (2015)).
²⁰ For the estimation of the wage growth equation we control for industry dummies and their
changes, and changes in occupations as they may be related to changes in the job component. Low
et al. (2010) assume that there are no industry shocks driving mobility, while we assume that there
are no within industry occupation specific shocks driving it.
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4.2.3.2 Wage Variance Estimates and Selection
This section presents the estimated correlations and risk components. Estimation is based
on minimizing the sum of squared residuals from the first and second moments of Equation
4.6 and the autocovariance terms, where we weight each individual contribution with the
underlying survey weight.²¹ We compute standard errors by the block-bootstrap procedure
proposed by Horowitz (2003).
Figure 4.2 displays the point estimates for wage risk. Appendix 4.A.6 contains the corre-
sponding estimated standard errors and the estimated correlations. All workers face substan-
tial permanent shocks to their human capital, and those shocks become more dispersed with
education. Furthermore, we find large dispersion of job effects in wage offers; those with
completed college facing the largest dispersion. The standard deviation of the wage offer
distribution ranges in the first period from 0.22 to 0.27. This implies that within 2 standard
deviations, the wage of the same worker varies by ± 54 percent depending on his job.²²
Regarding secular trends, the standard deviation of permanent wage risk increased for
all workers by approximately 0.01. For those with a college degree, the rise materialized in
the third period, while the increase is close to linear for the other education groups. Low
skilled workers faced a substantial lower permanent risk in the 1980s. Therefore, in relative
terms, lower skilled worker experience the most rise in uncertainty.
The dispersion of the wage offer distribution changed substantially for all workers. For
college workers, the standard deviation increased by 0.03. Again, the rise materializes in the
third period.²³ Similarly, college dropouts experienced an increase of 0.02. Similar to per-
manent risk, the rising uncertainty materialized already during the 1990s. Contrary to these
groups, high school workers experienced a decline in the dispersion to the wage offer distri-
bution by 0.04 in the third period. Finally, the dispersion to transitory wage shocks declines
for all workers. Unfortunately, we are unable to differentiate between true transitory shock
and measurement error. Consequently, the result represent a mix between the two. A falling
²¹We use a simplex method to find a local minimum and consider 30 different starting points to
insure that we find the global minimum.
²²Averaging over skill groups, our estimated dispersion at the wage offer distribution is similar to
the one found in Hall and Mueller (2015) who identify it using information on reported reservation
wages.
²³One concern may be that a decline in spurious job to job transitions due to sample redesign leads
to trends in the estimated wage offer distribution. As described in the Online Appendix, we attempt
to clean the data from such transitions. Moreover, we would expect the major break occurring from
the first to the second period, as data quality increased from 1990 onwards.
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dispersion; therefore, may be the result of improved interviewing techniques introduced in
the 1996 and 2004 survey (see Moore (2008)).
Figure 4.1. Evolution of the Wage Variance Components: Accounting for Selection
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Notes: Estimation is conducted by period and education degree group. To identify the components, we use the first and
second moments of wage growth, and the autocovariance function of wage growth up to lag 3. Appendix 4.A.6 provides
the correlations and bootstrapped standard errors.
Appendix 4.A.6 displays the estimated selection correlations. Workers show substantial
persistence in unobserved participation heterogeneity, consistent with the productivity and
match component being partially unobserved. In line with this, a positive innovations to
productivity increase participation. The correlation between the unobserved component of
mobility and participation decisions are for most of the cases significant and positive which
may suggest heterogeneity in job finding rates. The theoretical effects of shocks to human
capital and mobility are ambiguous. In the first two periods, we find a negative correlation
suggesting that, after a positive shock, workers are less likely to quit to non-employment to
search for a new job. In the last period, the correlation becomes positive for workers with
less than completed college. Put differently, after a negative shock those with completed
college are more likely to change their career, but lower educated workers stay with their
job. Similarly, Autor et al. (2014) find that following Chinese import penetration, low and
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medium skilled workers have not been able to offset wage losses, but high skilled workers
mostly have offset those by switching jobs. Finally, we find that a good outside offer increases
the propensity of a worker to move jobs. The model does not identify well the relationship
between shocks to outside offers and participation.
Our model does not differentiate between job switches within and between occupa-
tion/industry groups. To understand the source of trends in the wage offer distribution, we ex-
tend the model allowing the wage offer distribution to be different for those who stay within
the same industry and occupation (Within), and those who change either their occupation or
industry (Between). Fully estimating this model is beyond the scope of this paper, and we fix
the selection correlations to the ones we obtain at our baseline econometric model.²⁴ Figure
4.2 displays the evolution of the job component for these two groups. Regarding workers
with at least some college education, the increased dispersion in the wage offer distribution
results from more dispersed job offers for both within and between job switchers. For work-
ers with at most a high school degree, the decrease in the dispersion of the job component
is most pronounced for between movers. Interestingly, average wage growth from switching
industries/occupations tends to increase over time for workers with at least some college ed-
ucation, but decreases for high school workers. Taken together with declining mobility after
negative wage shocks, our results suggest that these workers face worsening opportunities
from switching jobs. Whether staying in their current career, or, particularly, when moving
to another industry/occupation, they are less likely to encounter a good paying job in the
2000s than in the 1980s.
Figure 4.2. Evolution of the job Component: Within vs. Between
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Notes: Within (Between) job component is identified through workers who stay (change) at the current industry and
occupation conditional on changing the employer. Estimation is conducted by period and education degree group. To
identify the components, we use the first and second moments of wage growth, and the autocovariance function of wage
growth up to lag 3. Selection correlations are fixed to the estimated ones in the baseline model.
²⁴ This implies setting ρξWµ = ρξBµ = ρξµ, ρξWpi = ρξBpi = ρξpi and ρξWpi−1 = ρξBpi−1 = ρξpi−1.
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Finally we ask, how important is it to account for selection? Using the process for indi-
vidual wages at Equation 4.1, we could identify the permanent, transitory and job compo-
nent when ignoring selection, using the second moments of (uncorrected) unexplained wage
growth for job stayers and movers.²⁵ Figure 4.3 provides the estimated components. Differ-
ent from our baseline results, permanent wage risk declines by 50% for workers with some
college education. Moreover, if we had ignored selection, we would have over-estimated the
increase in the job component at workers with at least some college and conclude it remains
flat for high school workers.
Figure 4.3. Evolution of the Wage Variance Components: Ignoring Selection
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Notes: Estimation is conducted by period and education degree group. To identify the components, we make use of the
second moment of (uncorrected) residual wage growth of job stayers, (σ2ε + Var(ei t)), and job movers, (σ
2
ε + 2σ
2
ψ
+
Var(ei t)), and the autocovariance function up to lag 3.
²⁵ In specific, the variance of job stayers would be σ2ε + Var(ei t), and the variance of job movers
would be σ2ε + 2σ
2
ψ
+ Var(ei t).
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4.3 The Effects of Changes in Risk on Wage Inequality
and Welfare
Our empirical results identify the changes in underlying risk that workers faced over the
last decades. Yet, they are silent about the quantitative consequences for wage inequality
and welfare. In order to identify these effects, we develop a partial equilibrium, life-cycle
incomplete-market model, consistent with the wage process and the selection mechanisms
from Section 4.2.
Importantly, we explicitly model workers’ insurance against risk through leisure, gov-
ernment insurance, and an on-the-job search technology. Our model extends the life-cycle
model developed by Low et al. (2010) with job-to-job transitions resulting from reallocation
shocks, which Tjaden and Wellschmied (2014) show to be important to infer the underlying
distribution of workers over heterogeneous jobs.
4.3.1 Model
The economy is populated by a finite number of workers I who have either high school,
some college, or college degree education. Time is discrete, workers live for H periods and
discount the future with factor β . As in our empirical analysis, the length of a period is one
quarter.
Workers spend 37 years in the labor market and another ten years in retirement. Within
each quarter, workers may be employed, unemployed, disabled, or retired.²⁶ Importantly, we
assume that financial markets are incomplete, such that workers have only access to a risk
free asset a that pays returns R= 1+ r, and are unable to borrow, at+1 ≥ 0.
At the beginning of life, worker i draws a log human capital according to pi1 ∼ N(µN ,σ2N ).
Afterwards, human capital follows a random walk with a drift component that depends on
the employment state and age:
pih+1 =

pih + ν1 + εih if employed and ≤ 50 years
pih + ν2 + εih if employed and > 50 years
pih − δ + εih if unemployed,
²⁶We allow agents in the model to work for, at most, 37 years such that it coincides with the same
age span we consider in our empirical analysis.
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where εih ∼ N(0,σ2ε), and h denotes the age of the worker. Wages in the data peak around
age 50, and we use ν1 and ν2 to match this wage profile. We make use of δ to reflect skill
depreciation during unemployment.
Workers search for jobs in a frictional labor market, both on and off the job. When meet-
ing a job, they randomly draw a log job component ψi j from a normal distribution with
cumulative distribution function F(ψ). Consequently, gross earnings for the employed are²⁷
wgih = exp(pih + ψi j).
The government grants several programs insuring workers against low earnings. First,
the earnings tax is progressive. Following Heathcote et al. (2015), earnings after taxes are
given by
wih = τcw
g
ih
τp ,
where τp < 1 determines the progressivity of the tax code.
Furthermore, we allow workers to receive unemployment benefits for the quarter follow-
ing job destruction. The benefits replace a constant fraction of worker’s last quarter earnings
subject to a cap:²⁸
bih = min{b¯wih−1, bmax}.
During the last ten working years, workers may receive disability insurance.²⁹ Moving to dis-
ability insurance is a permanent exit from the labor market. At its onset, disability insurance
required workers to have a health condition that prohibits working, something we abstract
from in our model. Autor and Duggan (2006) show that in 1984, the government greatly
relaxed the eligibility criteria, which used to require workers being unable to function in a
work setting, and shifted the criteria to alternative factors such as mental illness. As a result,
²⁷We abstract from intensive hours decisions and transform hourly wages from the data into earn-
ings assuming a 40 hour workweek. Furthermore, our simulations include transitory shocks to earning
but we assume to be measurement error.
²⁸ Legislation usually grants 26 weeks of benefits. Reducing benefits to one quarter allows us to
treat it similar to a lump-sum payment to those becoming unemployed. Consequently, the benefits
affect employment decisions only through a wealth effect. This assumption allows us to simplify the
problem of the unemployed worker as past earnings are not part of the state space of the unemployed.
²⁹ By legislation, workers may apply to disability insurance throughout their working life. Yet, most
people enter after the age of 50, possibly reflecting the fact that the acceptance probability rises with
that age.
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applications have risen substantially, particularly during recessions, and applicants have the
opportunity to challenge denial of benefits with three appeal steps. We model this applica-
tion procedure in such a way that benefits are only granted with probability υ. To apply for
benefits, legislation requires a worker to be continuously non-employed for 5 months, and
having worked before that period. To approximate this structure, the worker can only apply
one quarter after becoming non-employed. Moreover, the worker may not search for a job
within the same quarter of application. Benefits follow
S(w¯ih) =

0.9w¯ih if w¯ih ≤ d1
0.9d1 + 0.32(w¯ih − d1) if d1 < w¯ih ≤ d2
0.9d1 + 0.32(d2 − d1) + 0.15(w¯ih − d2) if w¯ih > d2,
where d1, d2 are bend points governing the concavity of benefits. w¯ih are the average earnings
of a worker i over his life-cycle at age h, following
w¯ih+1 =

wih+w¯ihh
h+1 if employed
w¯ihh
h+1 if unemployed
w¯ih if disabled or retired.
Consequently, concave benefits, and their dependence on past earnings, make disability in-
surance an attractive option for workers with poor earnings outcomes. After working life,
workers receive social security benefits, which follows the same formula as disability insur-
ance, and are fixed throughout retirement.
In addition, the government provides an universal means-tested program to all low in-
come workers that mirrors in parts the US Food Stamps Program. Denote by yi total worker
gross income minus a fixed income deductible, transfers are given by
Fih(yih) =
F − 0.3yih if yih < y ,0 otherwise .
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To summarize, total government transfers are
Tih =

Fh(w
g
ih) if employed,
Fh(bih) + bih if just became unemployed
Fh(0) if unemployed,
Fh(w¯ih) + S(w¯ih) if disabled,
Fh(w¯ih) + S(w¯ih) if retired.
Finally, workers derive utility from consumption and leisure. Aguiar and Hurst (2005)
show that households, after exiting employment, use the additional available time to engage
in home production and reduce shopping costs. To allow for this type of insurance, we choose
an utility function with complementarity between consumption and work:
Uih =
 cihexp(ϕPih)
1 − η
1−η
,
where the resulting consumption of the worker is given by
cih =
Raih + wih + Tih − aih+1 if employed,Raih + Tih − aih+1 if non-employed.
Based on this environment, we proceed with defining the value functions at each employment
state. Whenever a worker is retired or disabled, he does not face uncertainty and solves,
respectively, the following maximization problem:
Qh(a, w¯) = max
a′
¦
U + βQh+1(a′, w¯′)
©
Dh(a, w¯) = max
a′
¦
U + βDh+1(a′, w¯′)
©
.
The value function of an unemployed worker with the option to apply for disability is given
by:
Uh(a, p, w¯) = max
a′
¦
U + βΘh(a
′, p, w¯′)
©
,
where Θh is the upper envelope over applying for disability insurance and searching for a
job. The decision to apply for disability insurance is taken after the asset decision, but before
the end of period uncertainty reveals. The worker knows that the application is denied with
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probability 1−υ:
Θh(a
′, p, w¯′) ≡ max¦υDh+1(a′, w¯′) + (1 − υ)∫ Uh+1(a′, p′|p, w¯′)dp′
,
∫
EVUh(a
′, p′|p, w¯′)dp′©,
EVUh(a
′, p, w¯′) ≡ (1 − λu)
∫
Uh+1(a′, p′|p, w¯′)dp′
+ λu
∫ ∫
max
¦Wh+1(a′, p′|p,ψ′, w¯′),Uh+1(a′, p′|p, w¯′)©dF(ψ)dp′,
where λu is the job finding rate when unemployed. EVUh is the value of search in unemploy-
ment that a worker forgoes when applying to disability insurance. The value function of an
unemployed worker who is unable to apply for disability, solves the following problem
Uh(a, p, w¯) = max
a′
¦
U + βEVUh(a
′, p, w¯′)
©
.
Employed workers continue to sample job offers from the same distribution as the unem-
ployed. Searching for alternative jobs while being employed is an important insurancemecha-
nism against poor draws from the wage offer distribution. Following Tjaden andWellschmied
(2014), we allow job to job transitions to be a result of reallocation shocks. An employed
worker receives a job offer with probability λ and can in general decide to stay with his old
match, or form a new one. However, with probability λd , his choice is between the outside
offer and unemployment. Examples of the latter are temporary jobs, advanced layoff notice,
or firm bankruptcy. Consequently, the value of an employed worker of age h solves
Wh(a, p,ψ, w¯)= max
a′
¦
Uh + βEh
¦
(1−ω)
[(1−λ)Ξ +λ[(1−λd)ΩE +λdΛ]] +ωUh+1(a′, p′, w¯′)
©©
,
where we have defined the following upper envelops:
Ξ ≡
∫
max
¦Wh+1(a′, p′|p,ψ, w¯′),Uh+1(a′, p′|p, w¯′)©dp′
ΩE ≡
∫ ∫
max
¦Wh+1(a′, p′|p,ψ, w¯′),Uh+1(a′, p′|p, w¯′),Wh+1(a′, p′|p,ψ′, w¯′)©dF(ψ′)dp′
Λ ≡
∫ ∫
max
¦Wh+1(a′, p′|p,ψ′, w¯′),Uh+1(a′, p′|p, w¯′)©dF(ψ′)dp′.
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An employed worker keeps his job with exogenous probability 1−ω, in which case he may
receive an on-the-job offer. In the case of no offer, he may decide between staying employed
or quit and move into unemployment. When he receives an offer, it may be a regular offer
or a reallocation shock. In the former case he decides between his current job, the outside
offer, and unemployment, ΩE . In the latter case, the set of alternatives are the new offer or
unemployment, Λ.
4.3.2 Calibration
We calibrate the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the interest rate outside of our data.
The former, η, is set to 1.5, consistent with Attanasio and Weber (1995). Following Siegel
(2002), we fix the value of r to imply a yearly interest rate of 4%. The remaining parameters
in the model are calibrated to match empirical moments of the 1980’s in the United States;
the first period of our empirical analysis. Most of our calibration targets are education spe-
cific. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 summarize the calibration, and Appendix 4.A.7 reports the targeted
empirical moments.
We set the dispersion of the permanent shock and the dispersion of the wage offer distri-
bution to the values estimated in our empirical section. In order to match the average amount
of self-insurance present in the data, we calibrate β to target the mean wealth of the pop-
ulation between age 25 and 61. To calibrate the amount of insurance from leisure (ϕ), we
target the drop in employment rates between age 45 and 61. In our framework, the utility of
leisure may also capture other insurance mechanisms that we abstract from the model, such
as home production, reduced shopping costs of non-employed workers, and the labor supply
from other members at the household. The calibration implies that high skilled workers de-
rive substantially more utility from non-working, but the complementarity is not large for
any group.
We allow individuals to start with positive wealth at the beginning of their life. To do
so, we assume that initial wealth is a random draw from the estimated empirical wealth
distribution of young workers (between age 25 and 28). In addition, we set σ2N to match the
initial variance of log wage inequality, and µN , to match the average wage at the beginning
of workers’ life. Human capital, after the first period, follows a random walk that depends
on the employment state. The terms ν1,ν2, and δ are calibrated to target the average wage
changes from age 25 to 50 and from 51 to 61, and median wage losses from unemployment.
Given the estimated parameters of the wage process, it remains to calibrate the param-
eters that allows us to target the worker transition rates and the government programs. In
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Table 4.1. Main Calibration
Parameter HS SC C Target
σε 0.03 0.04 0.049 Dispersion permanent shock
σψ 0.26 0.24 0.27 Dispersion job effects
σN 0.29 0.31 0.29 Initial wage dispersion
µN 7.22 7.3 7.48 Initial mean wage
r 0.01 0.01 0.01 4% annual interest rate
(1− β)% 0.59 0.54 0.44 Wealth to earnings ratio
η 1.50 1.50 1.50 Risk aversion
ϕ -0.06 -0.1 -0.12 Employment drop 45-60
ν1 % 0.46 0.61 0.71 Wage growth 25-50
ν2 % -0.40 -0.58 -0.76 Wage growth 51-61
δ % 1.30 0.81 1.25 Wage losses from U
ω % 1.40 0.63 0 EU flow rate
λu % 17.62 18.51 20.04 UE flow rate
λ % 4.06 4.01 3.77 JTJ flow rate
λd % 49.90 48.15 42.40 % of wage cuts upon
Notes: HS refers to workers with at most a high school diploma, while SC to college dropouts,
and C to college degree. The left column states the variable, and the second, third, and fourth
column state the calibrated value. EU stands for employment to unemployment, UE for unem-
ployment to employment, JTJ for job to job movements, and U for unemployment.
Table 4.2. Calibration of Welfare State
Parameter Value Source
b¯ 0.70 Anderson and Meyer (1997)
bmax 1992 Price (1985)
F 680 Kerr et al. (1984)
d1 801 Social Security Administration (2016)
d2 4836 Social Security Administration (2016)
υ 0.43 Social Security Administration (2015)
τc 1.84 Tax schedule intercept
τp 0.89 Tax progessivity
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particular, the exogenous job destruction rate, ω, is set to match the movements from em-
ployment to unemployment not explained by endogenous separation, and λu to match the
job finding rate in the data.³⁰ Additionally, the information on job to job movements and
accompanying wage changes identify λ and λd . To this end, we define job to job transitions
whenever the worker reported to have been mostly employed in both quarters, and never
spend time searching between the two jobs when not employed. Our identifying assumption
for separating voluntary and involuntary movements consists in that the former always result
in expected wage increases. Together with the losses due to stochastic idiosyncratic shocks
to wage potential and transitory shocks, setting λd allows us to replicate the share of job to
job movements resulting in nominal wage losses.
Further, we calibrate the size of the welfare state to the mid 1980’s. Unemployment ben-
efits usually last two quarters in the United States. However, in the model, they only last one
quarter. To compensate, we calibrate the replacement rate to be twice the level estimated
by Anderson and Meyer (1997). Moreover, we compute the maximum benefit as the average
maximum benefits paid by US states.³¹ Wemodel the universal means-tested program in line
with the regulations from the Food Stamps Program for a household composed of 4 persons.
The maximum amount of benefits is calculated as the need for basic nutrition according to
the Thrifty food plan detailed in Kerr et al. (1984). The bend points d1 and d2 determine
the concavity of social security transfers. Social Security Administration (2016) reports the
appropriate values. The probability of acceptance into disability benefits, υ, is calibrated to
match the share of accepted claims between 1984 and 1993 that is reported in Social Secu-
rity Administration (2015). Finally, in order to calibrate the parameters of the tax function,
we estimate the following equation using the SIPP data³²
ln(wih) = ln(τ
c) + τp ln(wgih),
4.3.3 Model Fit
Given the specified calibration, our model is able to provide implications in regards to (untar-
geted) labor market outcomes. To begin with, our model predicts a decline in consumption
³⁰ To compute the latter, we only consider individuals who report searching for employment at least
one week within the quarter.
³¹ See Price (1985).
³²Weuse TAXSIM to construct wih. Given that taxes are filled at the household level, if the household
has more than one earner, we compute the individual tax as the share of the household tax according
to individual earnings contributions.
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after a job loss of 0.06 log points, while the available estimates from US predict a drop of less
of 0.1 log points (see Chetty (2006)). The decline in consumption in our model arise due
to insufficient insurance, and from complimentarity of work with consumption. The small
decline in the data is; therefore, is consistent with the latter being small.³³
Following Hornstein et al. (2012), the mean-minimum residual wage is a useful statistic
to evaluate the performance of search models with heterogeneous jobs. Particularly, it allows
us to assess the amount of sorting of workers over these heterogeneous jobs. The second row
in the table shows that our model closely matches the data. An alternative measure to judge
the amount of sorting over heterogeneous jobs are the wage dynamics conditional job to job
transitions. Rows three and four compare average wage growth, conditional on positive or
negative wage growth. Based on the data so as our model predictions, workers experience
on average wage changes around 0.26 log points. Approximately, 50% of transitions result
in wage loses, consequently, average wage gains from job to job transitions are close to zero.
Further, the excess variance of job stayers over job switchers is informative on the dis-
persion of the wage offer distribution. The model predicts relatively lower excess variance,
particularly for college dropouts. Put differently, the statistic suggests that workers are some-
what better sorted over jobs in the model than in the data. However, the difference is small.
Moreover, the model implies the correct ordering across education groups.
Table 4.3. Untargeted Moments
All Workers-Model All Workers-Data
∆ln(c) EU -0.06 −0.10∗
HS SC C HS SC C
Mean-min ratio 2.18 2.29 2.53 2.17 2.13 2.49
Wage gain JTJ % 29.29 24.98 29.72 28.23 25.62 30.28
Wage loss JTJ % -30.00 -25.50 -29.77 -25.16 -26.00 -29.07
V (∆wbi )-V (∆w
w
i ) 0.13 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.15
Notes: −0.1∗ denotes less than -0.1 log points (in absolute value). HS refers to workers with at
most a high school degree, while SC to college dropouts, and C to college degree. Data moments
refer to the first period of analysis in the data: 1983-1993. Mean-min ratio: is the ratio between
the average wage and the 5th percentile wage. V (∆wbi )-V (∆w
w
i ): is the excess variance of resid-
ual wage growth of job movers relative to job stayers.
Further, we ask whether our model is able to replicate our empirical results from Section
4.2.3. Our baseline model does not feature heterogeneity that would let us use exclusion
restriction to identify selection. We discuss in Appendix 4.A.8 an extended model which fea-
³³ Indeed, Browning and Crossley (2003) and Bloemen and Stancanelli (2005) show that consump-
tion does not drop upon unemployment for households with positive financial wealth.
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tures additional workers’ heterogeneity which allows us to obtain identification. The model
replicates the sign of the correlation coefficients found in Section 4.2.3. Similar to our finding
above, the model implies a somewhat smaller estimate for σφ .
Finally, we analyze the implications of inequality over the life cycle. The estimated earn-
ings uncertainty, together with the labor market friction and the selection, shape wage in-
equality over the life-cycle. Figure 4.4 compares this cross sectional wage inequality over
the life-cycle in the model relative to the data.³⁴ Both in model and the data, inequality in-
creases to similar amounts over the life-cycle. However, the model implies a too steep increase
early in life, and too little increase for elderly workers. The discrepancy may arise from two
sources. First, the model is simulated for a cohort which is followed for the entire life-cycle,
something impossible to do in the SIPP data. Consequently, our empirical estimates are based
on workers with, possibly, different wage risk at different stages of their lives. Second, we
get a pronounced decrease in inequality in the model at age 50 coming from the selection
into disability, while we do not observe this pattern empirically. In this respect, we assume
that workers may only apply to disability from age 50, while in the data workers may apply
to disability earlier in life, which may also explain the relatively lower increase of inequality
over the life-cycle in the data.
4.3.4 Sources of Rising Wage Inequality
To quantify how changes in underlying risk translate into changes in observed wage disper-
sion, we simulate our structural model with the risk parameters estimated for the 1980’s
and compare it to a simulation based on the risk parameters estimated for the 2000’s.³⁵ In
this experiment, changes in risk are the only difference between the two periods; the initial
dispersion of workers, mean wages, and the institutional framework are unchanged.
Table 4.4 compares the changes in inequality in the model to the data. Our model can
explain 84% of the increase in inequality for workers with at most some college, while we
overestimate by 15% the increase in inequality at college workers. Furthermore, empirically,
³⁴We proceed with some data adjustments for the particular analysis regarding the evolution of
wage inequality. To begin with, we trim the lowest 1% of observations of hourly income by educational
degree. Regarding top income, the surveys censors each source of income above specified top coded
levels. To account for this problem, we follow Heathcote et al. (2010b) and estimate the upper tail
of the income distribution assuming it follows a Pareto distribution. Further, we replace each right-
censored observation with a random draw from the fitted distribution, conditional on being larger
than the top-coded threshold.
³⁵We solve two separate steady states. As far as the data did not yet converge to the new steady
state, our model may overestimate the role that changes in risk play.
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Figure 4.4. Life Cycle Wage Profile
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Notes: The figure displays the variance in yearly log hourly wage over the life cycle in the model and the SIPP. To
ameliorate the effect of small amount of observations in the data, we compute the variance in log hourly wage by
age bins of 5 years. All series are normalized to zero at the first age group. The data features a series of worker
characteristics not present in the model. To make it comparable, we control in the data for race, region, metropoli-
tan area, marriage, and time fixed effects.
Table 4.4. Increase of Within-Education Wage Inequality
High School College Dropouts College
SIPP 0.022 0.043 0.040
Model 0.017 0.039 0.046
Model-Wage offer -0.020 0.003 0.007
Notes: The table displays the change in the variance of residual log wages between the
first and last period. Model: The change from model simulation based on the point esti-
mates of risk and wage offer distribution presented in Section 4.2.3.2. Model-Wage offer:
The change in inequality resulting from changes in the wage offer distribution only.
inequality has increased least in the group of workers with high school education, and the
model is consistent with this pattern. The row labeledWage offer displays changes in inequal-
ity when the dispersion of the wage offer distribution changes, and the dispersion of wage
shocks remains at the level of the first period. Changes in the wage offer distribution con-
tributed significantly to rising wage inequality for college dropouts, but little for the other
skill groups.³⁶
³⁶An increase in the wage offer distribution and a resulting rise of wage inequality is consistent
with several recent papers which find that between firm wage dispersion has increased over the last
decades. This includes Barth et al. (2013) and Song et al. (2015) for the US, Mueller et al. (2015) for
the UK, and Card et al. (2013) for Germany.
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4.3.5 Welfare Consequences of Rising Uncertainty
To assess the welfare consequences of changing wage uncertainty we simulate the change in
risk measured in the data between the first and the third period. The change in risk alters the
distribution of workers over employment and jobs; thereby, the tax revenue and public expen-
diture. Consequently, we re-calibrate the tax rate to assure that in both periods, conditional
on education, the size of the government budget remains unchanged:³⁷
B =
I∑
i=1
H∑
1
bihE
UI
ih + S(w¯ih)E
S
ih + Fh(yih)E
F
ih −
I∑
i=1
H∑
1
Pih(w
g
ih − τcwgihτ
p
),
where EUIih , E
D
ih, and E
T
ih are indicators that reflect whether a person receives unemployment
benefits, disability/social security insurance, and means tested transfers, respectively.
Our welfare measure is the willingness to pay in terms of life-time consumption. Let cih
be the consumption of a worker of age h in the original economy, and cˆih be the consumption
in the alternative economy. The fraction of consumption which makes the worker indifferent
between being born in the two different economies solves:
E0
H∑
h=1
βhU(cih, Pih) = E0
H∑
h=1
βhU((1 + ω)cˆih, Pˆih), (4.7)
We assume the initial distribution over states to be the same; thus, the willingness to pay is
given by
ω =
E0V1
E0Vˆ1
 1
1−ν − 1.
Table 4.5 shows the welfare consequences of changing uncertainty between the first and
the third period. The top rows shows the willingness to pay, before uncertainty about educa-
tional status is resolved. On average, an unborn worker is willing to forgo 0.23% of life-time
consumption to avoid the additional risk.
These welfare costs are not evenly distributed across education groups. The first row in
Table 4.5 displays the willingness to pay after workers know their educational status. Workers
with at most high school education and college dropouts are willing to pay 0.5 percent of life-
time consumption to avoid the change in risk. In contrast, workers with completed college
experience welfare gains from the increased uncertainty.
³⁷Hence, we abstract from insurance mechanisms that may occur between education groups.
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Table 4.5.Welfare Effects of Rising Uncertainty
High School College Dropouts College
Total wage risk % 0.51 0.56 -0.5
Wage offer % 0.41 -0.45 -1.07
Weaker government % 1.05 1.2 1.09
Notes: All workers: The table displays the average willingness to pay of an unborn worker, ag-
gregating low skilled and high skilled workers, to avoid the increase in wage risk and wage offer
distribution between the 1980’s and 2000’s. Total wage risk: The willingness to pay based on
changes in permanent wage risk and changes in the wage offer distribution, by skill level, be-
tween the 1980’s and 2000’s.Wage offer: The willingness to pay resulting from only changes in
the wage offer distribution, by skill level, between the 1980’s and 2000’s. Weaker government:
The only insurance program is one half of the original benefit level of the universal means-tested
program.
To shed some light on these results, we disentangle the effects of changes in permanent
wage risk, and changes in the wage offer distribution. To this end, the second row displays
the welfare effects from changing the wage offer distribution but keeping permanent wage
risk at its old level. All type of workers prefer a more dispersed wage offer distribution. In a
search model, an increase in the wage offer dispersion creates an option value to the worker:
He can always break away from particular poor matches and search to find a better match.
This option value outweighs the costs of increased uncertainty. Quantitatively, the increase
in dispersion is largest for workers with finished college; consequently, they gain the most.
Moreover, for a given increase in dispersion, the welfare implications are largest for these
workers. Increasing the standard deviation by 0.01, increases the willingness to pay by 0.32
for this group, but only by 0.12 and 0.25 for the other two groups.
Comparing total welfare changes to those where only the wage offer distribution changes,
provides the net effect of changes in permanent wage risk. All workers are willing to pay to
reduce this type of risk, but again, there is substantial heterogeneity. To avoid an increase of
the standard deviation by 0.01, workers are willing to pay between 0.1 and 1 percent of life-
time consumption. The heterogeneity arises from the different degree of insurance resulting
from self-insurance, leisure, and the government.
To evaluate the importance of the government providing insurance against increasing
wage risk, the third row computes welfare changes for a hypothetical economy where there
is only social security. Hence, we do not consider disability insurance nor unemployment
insurance, taxes are proportional, and themaximumbenefits from the universal means-tested
program are reduced by 50%.³⁸ Comparing the results to the second row, the government
plays an important role in shielding workers from rising wage uncertainty. All type of workers
³⁸We allow for a low level of means-tested transfers to insure that income is always positive.
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would be willing to give up substantial more life-time consumption to avoid the change in
risk in this hypothetical economy.
Table 4.6.Welfare Effects of Increasing the Welfare State
High School College Dropouts College
More UI % 0.31 0.39 0.54
More UM % 0.04 -0.14 -0.14
More DI % 0.55 0.53 0.58
Notes: All workers: The table displays the average willingness to pay of an unborn
worker to avoid an increase in the welfare state financed by a 1.66 percentage point
rise in average taxes.More UI:Unemployment insurance.More UM: Universal means-
tested program. More DI: Increase acceptance probability of disability insurance.
So far, we did not address the question whether the level of governmental insurance in
the 1980’s was adequate to insure workers. Table 4.6 provide welfare outcomes when we
increase the level of different governmental programs in this period, each financed by an in-
cremental change of average taxes by 1.66 percentage points. Raising average and maximum
benefits of unemployment insurance leads to welfare losses for all three type of workers, par-
ticularly the higher skilled. There are small welfare gains present when increasing benefits
of the universal means-tested program, except for workers with at most high school edu-
cation. This program has relatively weak employment disincentive effects, and it provides
insurance against persistent earnings losses. Disability insurance is one of the fasted growing
income support programs. Autor and Duggan (2006) show that its growth is closely linked
to widening eligibility criteria, an increase in υ in our framework. The last row shows that
across education groups, workers are willing to spend around 0.5% of life-time consumption
to avoid the more generous eligibility requirement. Disability insurance has relatively large
employment affects after age 50 in our economy. The resulting increase in the tax burden
creates the large welfare losses. The finding is in contrast to Low and Pistaferri (2015) who
find welfare gains of loosening eligibility requirements. One difference is that they explicitly
model health status that affects acceptance probabilities. Another difference is that we infer
a much smaller value for the complementarity of consumption and leisure for low skilled.³⁹
As a result, our model favors transfer programs that keep workers employed; such as the
universal means-tested program.
³⁹A further difference is that in contrast to them, average earnings is a state variable in our model
which makes past earnings shocks part of the decision for disability insurance.
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4.4 Conclusion
This study estimates trends in labor market risk in US for the last three decades, decomposing
workers’ earning risk into permanent shocks to idiosyncratic productivity, and a job specific
wage component. Importantly, our approach allows us distangle exogenous fluctuations at
earnings from endogenous choices in response to these shocks. Using data for males over the
period 1983-2013, we find that wage risk has evolved differently across education groups
over the last decades. While permanent wage risk increased by about 0.01 for all workers,
heterogeneity in job offers has only risen for workers with at least some college education.
In order to quantitatively understand the implications of our empirical findings for wage
inequality and welfare, we build a structural partial equilibrium model of life-time utility
maximization, which is consistent with the endogenous selection mechanisms present in the
data. When simulating the increase in wage risk obtained empirically, we find that the model
can account for 85% of the increase in within education wage inequality in US during the
last three decades.
At the same time, the welfare costs of increased uncertainty are small. Our model explic-
itly models government transfer programs and workers endogenously selecting into these.
These very programs shield workers from most of the increase in earnings risk. In addition,
workers with at least some college education, compensate the increase in productivity risk
with amore dispersed wage offer distribution. Larger dispersion in the latter creates an option
value to the worker: He can always terminate poor matches and search for a better match.
Our analysis focuses only on male workers and does not explicitly model joint household
decisions. Yet, spousal labor participation could serve as an additional insurance mechanism
against individual labor market risk. Some interesting initial approaches in this direction are
Shore (2010) and Blundell et al. (2008). These studies do not make a distinction between
exogenous income risk fluctuations and endogenous outcomes. Erosa et al. (2012) propose
a framework to estimate shocks to spouses productivity jointly, taking into account the par-
ticipation margin.
Appendix 4.A Appendix
4.A.1 Moments for the Wage Variance
To reduce notation, we drop the i and t subscripts on variables. We begin by deriving the
selection term present in wage growth:
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E[∆Wis|Pis = Pis−1 = 1] = E[∆Wis|Pis = Pis−1 = 1,Mis = 0]P(Mis = 0|Pis = Pis−1 = 1)
+ E[∆Wis|Pis = Pis−1 = 1,Mis = 1]P(Mis = 1|Pis = Pis−1 = 1)
= β∆x is + P(Mis = 0|Pis = Pis−1 = 1)
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where
Φ11(y1, y2;ρ) =
∫ ∞
y1
∫ ∞
y2
φ(x1, x2,ρ)dx1dx2,
Φ111(y1, y2, y3;Ω) =
∫ ∞
y1
∫ ∞
y2
∫ ∞
y3
φ(x1, x2, x3,Ω)dx1dx2dx3,
and ρu1u2·u3 denotes the partial correlation of u1 and u2 controlling for u3.
Given our wage model specification, we can derive the expected wage growth
for job stayers and movers not explained by observable person characteristic. The
expected value for the former is:
E(gi t |Pi t = Pi t−1 = 1,Mi t = 0) =
ρεpiσεφ(−zα)Φ21
−κθ+ρµpizαq
1−ρ2µpi ,
−z−1α+ρpipi−1zαq
1−ρ2pipi−1
;ρµpi−1·pi

Φ121(−zα,−κθ ,−z−1α;Ω)
−
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
Φ121(−zα,−κθ ,−z−1α;Ω) , (4.8)
where
Φ21(y1, y2;ρ) =
∫ y1
−∞
∫ ∞
y2
φ(x1, x2,ρ)dx1dx2,
Φ121(y1, y2, y3;Ω) =
∫ ∞
y1
∫ y2
−∞
∫ ∞
y3
φ(x1, x2, x3,Ω)dx1dx2dx3.
Economic theory would suggest that negative shocks to wage potential decrease par-
ticipation. Hence, because the worker participates, his shock to ε could not be too
negative. The first term of (4.8), simply speaking, relates the probability to partici-
pate, correcting for autocorrelation, to wage growth of job stayers, which identifies
ρεpi.
Similarly, the relationship betweenwage growth of job stayers and the probability
to change jobs identifies ρεµ. Mi t may be one when the worker leaves his former job
due to a poor wage potential draw. Consequently, we expect a positive relationship,
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i.e., a person who is likely to make a mobility, but did not do so, cannot have had a
too large negative wage shock.
Further, the expected wage growth of job switchers is given by:
E(gi t |Pi t = Pi t−1 = 1,Mi t = 1) =
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. (4.9)
The parameter ρξµ is expected to be positive, i.e., a large positive innovation in the
job component should encourage mobility. We would also think that the estimated
ρξpi should be positive, i.e., a good outside offer increases participation. However,
this variable is likely not well identified. The population of workers which identi-
fies it are those who had a large enough negative ε shock to trigger quitting into
non-employment, but at the same time a sufficient large positive innovation in ξ to
prevent this move. These are likely to be very few.
The first moments alone identify the selection terms up to the scalars σε and σξ.
To identify the standard deviations separately, we require the variance of the wage
growth for job stayers and job switchers. The wage growth for job stayers is defined
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as
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where Var(ei t) refers to the variance in the transitory component. This equation
makes explicit that the true variance σ2
ε
is different from the one observed in the
data for job stayers because the latter are a self-selected group. First, part of the true
shocks are not observed as workers decide quitting into non-employment given a
sufficiently large negative shocks. Second, given that the workers made no mobility,
the realized shock cannot have been too negative. Third, the interaction of these two
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effects enters and a correction for the autocorrelation in participation decisions. The
variance of wage growth of job switchers is given by:
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φ(−z−1α,−zα,ρpipi−1)Φ1−κθ+ρµpi−1 ·piz−1α+ρ˜µpizαq1−ρ2µpi−1q1−ρ˜2µpi

(ρpiξ − ρpipi−1ρpi−1ξ)
Φ111(−zα,−κθ ,−z−1α;Ω)
+
φ(−z−1α,κθ ,ρµpi−1)Φ1
−zα+ρpipi−1·µz−1α+ρ˜µpiκθq
1−ρ2pipi−1
q
1−ρ˜2µpi

(ρµξ − ρµpi−1ρpi−1ξ)
Φ111(−zα,−κθ ,−z−1α;Ω)

+ Var(ei t),
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where the variance of the wage offer distribution is given by σ2
φ
=
σ2
ξ
2 . Regarding
interpretation, a similar logic as for job stayers applies with the important difference
that there is now an innovation to the job component. Regarding the latter, addi-
tional correction terms arise through its correlation to past participation decisions.
The variance of the transitory component is given by
Var(ei t) = σ
2
i

1 + (1 + χ1)
2 + (χ2 − χ1)2 + χ22

.
We identify these process by the autocovariance function of wage growth up to lag
3. Note that σ2
ε
and σ2
ξ
are not part of these moments.⁴⁰
Cov(gi t , gi t−1)= σ2i
− (1+χ1)+ (1+χ1)(χ2 −χ1)−χ2(χ2 −χ1)
Cov(gi t , gi t−2)= σ2i
− (χ2 −χ1)− (1+χ1)χ2
Cov(gi t , gi t−3)= σ2i χ2
4.A.2 Datasets Selection and Cleaning
In this section, we describe the dataset used in our study: Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP). The SIPP is conducted by the US Census Bureau. It is a longitudinal
multi-panel survey, nationally representative of adults in households in the United States.
The survey aims to complement the information given by CPS, providing monthly and longi-
tudinal information on the distribution of income, wealth, employment, and program eligi-
bility and participation in the society. Individuals are interviewed, depending on the panel,
up to 14 times at four-month intervals, and are being asked about their income and work
experience during the preceding four months.
Following the recommendation by the US Census Bureau, we merge the core files and
the longitudinal files for the samples from 1984 to 1993 and keep only observations present
in both. This assures that we use longitudinal imputation techniques in the earlier surveys
consistent with the surveys after 1993. Also, following the recommendation from the US
Census Bureau, we do not consider observations for which no interview was obtained. Finally,
we concentrate on working-age males, aged between 25 and 61 years-old. Moreover, we do
⁴⁰We assume P(Mi t = 1|Mi t−1 = 1,Mi t−2 = 1,Mi t−3 = 1,Mi t−4 = 1)= 0. Estimating the transitory
shock process only on job stayers gives practically the same results.
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not consider individuals with missing information on education, working status, or with self-
employment status.
We identify jobs by employer ID numbers. We construct hourly wages at the job level
by dividing quarterly earnings at the job by the total hours worked at this firm within the
quarter. As workers, in principle, could have multiple jobs within the same quarter, we define
the main job as the one with the most quarterly earnings.⁴¹ Importantly, for our purpose to
identify mobility, the SIPP assigns an identifying number to each firm individual is working.
This allows us to determine whenever the worker change jobs across time and his respective
change in hourly wage.
The SIPP provides two possibilities to construct earnings, reported earnings and the
hourly pay rate. Unfortunately, the two do not always coincide and we use for each indi-
vidual the measure which yields the lowest variance of wage growth across waves. As our
focus is on wage dynamics, we proceed with some adjustments to imputed values which use
longitudinal information not used by the SIPP procedure.⁴² Conditional on earnings being
imputed in a wave, and conditional on the worker not changing his job nor the hours worked
from the previous to subsequent wave, we assume that imputed earnings are the median
values across waves. Further, when an individual does not provide information on the hourly
rate at a wave, but does in the preceding and following wave, we use the mean hourly rate
(conditional on the hourly rate to change by less than 5%), to impute the missing value. Fi-
nally, we do not consider individuals where imputed hourly rate or earnings increase by more
than 30% at monthly frequency, conditional on job and hours remaining constant.
Crucial to our identification of secular trends is that sample redesign does not alter the
precision to which we identify job to job transitions. Starting in the 1996 panel, the SIPP
uses dependent interviewing techniques for employer names on which basis the employed
ID numbers are assigned. For the panels from 1990-1993, we use the cleaned employer ID
numbers from Stinson (2003) which combine the survey data with administrative records to
accurately identify these changes. To avoid spurious transitions, particularly before the 1990
panel, we keep the main job constant when the main employed ID changes for one month,
but is the same in the month before and after, and the individual still works at this job. Finally,
we drop observations where an individual is recalled from his former employer.⁴³ Note that,
⁴¹ The SIPP collects data up to two jobs for each individual at each month.
⁴² In order to reduce the amount of missing values, the SIPP employs a hot desk procedure to impute
for these observations. The procedure consist in finding a close match of the missing observation
of a worker with respondents, based on age, race, gender, marital status, household relationship,
education, among other.
⁴³We think of this as workers having a special search technology not well represented by our model.
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if the panels prior to 1990 suffered from spurious transitions, we would expect the dispersion
of wage growth of job switchers to change from the first to the second period. This is not the
case as discussed in the main text.
4.A.3 Hourly Wage Growth Dispersion
A common measure of idiosyncratic wage risk is the variance of wage growth not explained
by worker observables. Figure 4.5 displays the variance of residual quarterly wage growth in
the last three decades in the SIPP.⁴⁴ In line with recent administrative data from Guvenen
et al. (2014), none of the education groups show an upward trend. The dispersion of wage
growth peaked in the period 1993-2003, and is well below its initial level in 2004-2013.
Resulting from labor market frictions, different jobs may pay different wages to the same
worker. Wage changes of workers who switch their job entail information on the presence
of such job effects. We split our sample into job stayers (workers staying with the current
employer) and job movers (employees switching their employer). Job stayers dominate the
sample and the evolution of the variance in wage growth closely resembles the complete sam-
ple. Contrary, the variance of wage growth of job movers exhibit a positive trend, particularly
after the second period, for workers with at least some college education.
Figure 4.5. Hourly Wage Growth Dispersion
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Notes: The solid line is the dispersion of residual hourly wage growth for low skilled workers (high-school degree
or less), while the dashed line corresponds to high skilled workers (more than high-school degree). To obtain the
residual wage growth, we estimate a weighted (defined as the survey weights) regression of log hourly wage as
a function of a quadratic in age and work experience, race, marital status, unemployment rate at the state level,
indicators whether person lives at a metropolitan area or is disable, industry, occupations, time and region fixed
effects.
⁴⁴ To obtain the residual wage growth, we estimate a weighted (defined as the survey weights)
regression of log hourly wage as a function of a quadratic in age and work experience, race, marital
status, unemployment rate at the state level, indicators whether person lives at a metropolitan area
or is disable, industry, occupations, time and region fixed effects. Coefficients are allowed to vary by
education and period.
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Table 4.7. Nested Trivariate Probit: High School
Participation Participation Participation
(1983-1993) (1994-2003) (2004-2013)
Age 0.069∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ -0.008
Age_sq -0.024∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
UI 0.001 -0.001 -0.002∗∗
Log(Other Income) -0.096∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗
Housing 0.359∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗
Disability -0.644∗∗∗ -0.479∗∗∗ -0.557∗∗∗
Exper 0.246∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗ 0.025
Exper_sq -0.067∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗
Metro 0.073∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
Married 0.361∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
State Unemp (%) -9.444∗∗∗ -9.891∗∗∗ -5.215∗∗∗
White 0.527∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗
Year dummies 136.04∗∗∗ 26.62∗∗∗ 33.19∗∗∗
(10 df) (9 df) (9 df)
Regional dummies 26.19∗∗∗ 51.38∗∗∗ 12.20∗∗∗
(3 df) (3 df) (3 df)
Quarter dummies 22.47∗∗∗ 11.21∗∗∗ 33.04∗∗∗
(3 df) (3 df) (3 df)
Constant 1.495∗∗∗ 1.541∗∗∗ 1.612∗∗∗
Mobility Mobility Mobility
(1983-1993) (1994-2003) (2004-2013)
Age -0.077∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.032∗
Age_sq 0.017∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.000
UI -0.002∗ -0.000 -0.002
Log(Other Income) -0.007∗ 0.004 0.008
Housing -0.152∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.064
Exper -0.330∗∗∗ -0.710∗∗∗ -0.300∗∗∗
Exper_sq 0.086∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.039
Disability 0.227∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ -0.035
Metro 0.054∗∗ 0.050∗ -0.050
Married -0.042∗ 0.005 0.086∗∗∗
State Unemp (%) -1.304∗∗ -1.348 -4.610∗∗∗
White 0.038 -0.020 -0.026
Year dummies 150.24∗∗∗ 17.38∗∗ 17.00∗∗
(10 df) (9 df) (9 df)
Regional dummies 58.89∗∗∗ 25.53∗∗∗ 28.20∗∗∗
(3 df) (3 df) (3 df)
Quarter dummies 17.08∗∗∗ 7.13∗ 6.62∗
(3 df) (3 df) (3 df)
Industry dummies 243.02∗∗∗ 39.75∗∗∗ 18.09∗∗∗
(6 df) (6 df) (6 df)
Occupation dummies 72.76∗∗∗ 34.03∗∗∗ 28.20∗∗∗
(9 df) (9 df) (9 df)
Constant -1.095∗∗∗ -0.724∗∗∗ -0.921∗∗∗
Obs 108831 42121 26339
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. For region, year, quarter,
industry and occupation dummies we report the value of the χ2 statis-
tics of joint significance, and in parenthesis, the test constraints degrees
of freedom.
4.A.4 Estimated Regressions
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Table 4.8. Nested Trivariate Probit: College Dropouts
Participation Participation Participation
(1983-1993) (1994-2003) (2004-2013)
Age 0.032∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗
Age_sq -0.008 -0.029∗∗∗ 0.001
UI -0.004∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.001
Log(Other Income) -0.100∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗∗
Housing 0.287∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗
Disability -0.650∗∗∗ -0.536∗∗∗ -0.473∗∗∗
Exper 0.219∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗
Exper_sq -0.069∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗
Metro 0.024 0.057 0.066∗∗
Married 0.408∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗
State Unemp (%) -8.791∗∗∗ -10.879∗∗∗ -3.642∗∗∗
White 0.458∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
Year dummies 113.04∗∗∗ 53.57∗∗∗ 59.55∗∗∗
(10 df) (9 df) (9 df)
Regional dummies 74.18∗∗∗ 21.46∗∗∗ 16.82∗∗∗
(3 df) (3 df) (3 df)
Quarter dummies 5.22 22.47∗∗∗ 41.02∗∗∗
(3 df) (3 df) (3 df)
Constant 2.144∗∗∗ 2.191∗∗∗ 1.422∗∗∗
Mobility Mobility Mobility
(1983-1993) (1994-2003) (2004-2013)
Age -0.086∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗
Age_sq 0.024∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.017
UI -0.001 0.002 0.004∗∗
Log(Other Income) -0.000 0.008 0.005
Housing -0.201∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗
Exper -0.116∗ -0.510∗∗∗ -0.013
Exper_sq 0.044∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ -0.022
Disability 0.066 0.235∗∗∗ 0.128
Metro 0.126∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗ -0.035
Married -0.094∗∗∗ -0.047 -0.038
State Unemp (%) 0.802 -0.180 -3.042∗∗∗
White 0.137∗∗∗ 0.038 -0.041
Year dummies 65.42∗∗∗ 14.74∗ 12.97
(10 df) (9 df) (9 df)
Regional dummies 14.97∗∗∗ 1.80 10.48∗∗
(3 df) (3 df) (3 df)
Quarter dummies 8.58∗∗ 6.22 3.69
(3 df) (3 df) (3 df)
Industry dummies 118.70∗∗∗ 58.54∗∗∗ 92.33∗∗∗
(6 df) (6 df) (6 df)
Occupation dummies 67.53∗∗∗ 42.48∗∗∗ 26.80∗∗∗
(9 df) (9 df) (9 df)
Constant -1.325∗∗∗ -0.479 -0.266
Obs 38086 21558 24455
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. For region, year, quarter,
industry and occupation dummies we report the value of the χ2 statis-
tics of joint significance, and in parenthesis, the test constraints degrees
of freedom.
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Table 4.9. Nested Trivariate Probit: College
Participation Participation Participation
(1983-1993) (1994-2003) (2004-2013)
Age 0.055∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ -0.011
Age_sq -0.031∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗
UI -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
Log(Other Income) -0.112∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗
Housing 0.333∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗
Disability -0.662∗∗∗ -0.657∗∗∗ -0.473∗∗∗
Exper 0.289∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗
Exper_sq -0.088∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗
Metro 0.086∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗
Married 0.372∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
State Unemp (%) -6.558∗∗∗ -5.306∗∗∗ -3.831∗∗∗
White 0.406∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
Year dummies 146.28∗∗∗ 71.64∗∗∗ 59.39∗∗∗
(10 df) (9 df) (9 df)
Regional dummies 40.51∗∗∗ 10.26∗∗ 12.81∗∗∗
(3 df) (3 df) (3 df)
Quarter dummies 6.70∗ 6.90∗ 22.66∗∗∗
(3 df) (3 df) (3 df)
Constant 2.063∗∗∗ 1.874∗∗∗ 1.777∗∗∗
Mobility Mobility Mobility
(1983-1993) (1994-2003) (2004-2013)
Age -0.075∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.026
Age_sq 0.016∗ -0.011 0.002
UI -0.003∗∗ -0.001∗ -0.000
Log(Other Income) -0.012∗∗ -0.010 -0.015∗∗∗
Housing -0.187∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗
Exper -0.139∗∗ -0.558∗∗∗ 0.079
Exper_sq 0.046∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ -0.036
Disability 0.241∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.072
Metro 0.012 0.018 -0.052
Married -0.102∗∗∗ -0.027 0.077∗∗∗
State Unemp (%) 0.652 -0.628 1.384∗
White -0.036 0.009 -0.026
Year dummies 73.81∗∗∗ 32.87∗∗∗ 40.88∗∗∗
(10 df) (9 df) (9 df)
Regional dummies 11.14∗∗ 13.78∗∗∗ 10.70∗∗
(3 df) (3 df) (3 df)
Quarter dummies 11.65∗∗∗ 15.41∗∗∗ 14.13∗∗
(3 df) (3 df) (3 df)
Industry dummies 78.12∗∗∗ 91.35∗∗∗ 58.17∗∗∗
(6 df) (6 df) (6 df)
Occupation dummies 94.32∗∗∗ 76.86∗∗∗ 72.33∗∗∗
(9 df) (9 df) (9 df)
Constant -0.871∗∗∗ -0.701∗∗ -1.371∗∗∗
Obs 67018 41350 44764
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. For region, year, quarter,
industry and occupation dummies we report the value of the χ2 statis-
tics of joint significance, and in parenthesis, the test constraints degrees
of freedom.
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4.A.5 Hourly Wage growth
Before we proceed with the estimation and decomposition of income risk into the perma-
nent, transitory and job component, we proceed by removing any predictable change in
wage growth such as age, marital status, education, among others. Importantly, to obtain
unbiased estimates, we need to account for the selection into participation and job mobility.
In Appendix 4.A.1 we derive the selection terms present in wage growth. Making use of this
derivation, let us define the components to be included in the wage growth regression in
order to account for the selection:
C1 =
φ(−zγ)φ(−zγ)Φ21(A12,A13;ρµpi−1·pi)∫∞
−zγ
∫∞
−z−1γφ(x1, x3,ρpipi−1)dx1dx3
C2 =
φ(−κθ)Φ11(A21,A23;ρpi−1pi·µ)∫∞
−zγ
∫∞
−z−1γφ(x1, x3,ρpipi−1)dx1dx3
C3 =
φ(−zγ)Φ11(A12,A13;ρµpi−1·pi)∫∞
−zγ
∫∞
−z−1γφ(x1, x3,ρpipi−1)dx1dx3
C4 =
φ(−z−1γ)Φ11(A31,A32;ρµpi·pi−1)∫∞
−zγ
∫∞
−z−1γφ(x1, x3,ρpipi−1)dx1dx3
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where
Φ21(A12,A13;ρµpi−1·pi) = Φ
21
 −κθ + ρµpizαq
1 − ρ2µpi
,
−z−1α + ρpipi−1zαq
1 − ρ2pipi−1
;ρµpi−1·pi
!
,
Φ11(A21,A23;ρpi−1pi·µ) = Φ
11
 −zα + ρµpiκθq
1 − ρ2µpi
,
−z−1α + ρµpi−1κθq
1 − ρ2µpi−1
;ρpipi−1·µ
!
,
Φ11(A12,A13;ρµpi−1·pi) = Φ
11
 −κθ + ρµpizαq
1 − ρ2µpi
,
−z−1α + ρpipi−1zαq
1 − ρ2pipi−1
;ρµpi−1·pi
!
,
Φ11(A31,A32;ρµpi·pi−1) = Φ
11
 −zα + ρpipi−1z−1αq
1 − ρ2pipi−1
,
−κθ + ρµpi−1z−1αq
1 − ρ2µpi−1
;ρµpi·pi−1
!
,
Φ11(y1, y2;ρ) =
∫ ∞
y1
∫ ∞
y2
φ(x1, x2,ρ)dx1dx2,
Φ21(y1, y2;ρ) =
∫ y1
−∞
∫ ∞
y2
φ(x1, x2,ρ)dx1dx2.
4.A.6 Wage Variance Estimates
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Table 4.10.Wage growth regression: High School
Wage growth Wage growth Wage growth
(1983-1993) (1994-2003) (2004-2013)
Age -0.001∗∗ -0.000 -0.001
Age_sq 0.001 0.000 0.000
Married -0.000 -0.000 0.001
Ch. Married 0.007 0.016∗∗ 0.00
White 0.000 -0.003 -0.000
Unemp (%) -0.066∗∗ 0.094 -0.078
Ch. Unemp (%) 0.053 0.375 0.081
Exper -0.001 0.011 -0.011
Exper_sq 0.000 -0.002 0.0039∗
Ch. Metro 0.007 0.016 0.009
Metro 0.001 -0.001 0.001
Disability -0.000 -0.005 -0.002
Ch. Disability -0.027 0.001 -0.012
Year dummies 2.57∗∗∗ 0.92 2.79∗∗∗
(10 df) (9 df) (9 df)
Regional dummies 0.43 0.55 0.14
(3 df) (3 df) (3 df)
Ch. Regional dummies 1.94 0.92 0.58
(3 df) (3 df) (3 df)
Quarter dummies 8.52∗∗∗ 3.81∗∗∗ 13.31∗∗∗
(3 df) (3 df) (3 df)
Industry dummies 2.93∗∗∗ 0.79 0.38
(6 df) (6 df) (6 df)
Ch. Occupation dummies 5.80∗∗∗ 4.12∗∗∗ 1.09
(9 df) (9 df) (9 df)
Ch. Industry dummies 4.77∗∗∗ 1.50 2.45∗∗
(6 df) (6 df) (6 df)
C1 0.009 0.014 0.004
C2 0.017 0.064 0.018
C3 0.624 0.388 -0.010
C4 -0.257 -0.917 -0.478
Constant -0.000 -0.021 0.046∗
Obs 98956 38362 22486
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. For region, year, quarter, indus-
try and occupation dummies we report the value of the χ2 statistics of joint
significance, and in parenthesis, the test constraints degrees of freedom.
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Table 4.11.Wage growth regression: College Dropouts
Wage growth Wage growth Wage growth
(1983-1993) (1994-2003) (2004-2013)
Age -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
Age_sq 0.001 0.001 0.001
Married -0.001 0.004 0.003
Ch. Married -0.002 0.010 0.013
White 0.002 0.002 0.002
Unemp (%) -0.082∗ -0.064 -0.086
Ch. Unemp (%) -0.098 -0.861 0.236
Exper 0.005 0.008 -0.003
Exper_sq -0.001 -0.001 0.001
Ch. Metro 0.009 0.044∗ -0.008
Metro -0.001 0.003 -0.001
Disability 0.001 -0.003 0.001
Ch. Disability 0.090∗ -0.020∗∗ -0.002
Year dummies 1.74∗ 1.46 3.40∗∗∗
(10 df) (9 df) (9 df)
Regional dummies 0.67 0.08 0.75
(3 df) (3 df) (3 df)
Ch. Regional dummies 1.50 0.96 0.76
(3 df) (3 df) (3 df)
Quarter dummies 1.78 8.13∗∗∗ 5.06∗∗∗
(3 df) (3 df) (3 df)
Industry dummies 0.48 0.60 0.03
(6 df) (6 df) (6 df)
Ch. Occupation dummies 3.29∗∗∗ 2.52∗∗∗ 2.69∗∗∗
(9 df) (9 df) (9 df)
Ch. Industry dummies 5.13∗∗∗ 2.47∗∗ 1.25
(6 df) (6 df) (6 df)
C1 0.012 0.033 -0.006
C2 0.034 0.047 -0.028
C3 -3.813∗∗∗ 0.273 0.206
C4 8.725∗∗ -0.650 0.107
Constant 0.003 -0.023 0.024
Obs 35903 20346 21815
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. For region, year, quarter, indus-
try and occupation dummies we report the value of the χ2 statistics of joint
significance, and in parenthesis, the test constraints degrees of freedom.
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Table 4.12.Wage growth regression: College
Wage growth Wage growth Wage growth
(1983-1993) (1994-2003) (2004-2013)
Age -0.001 -0.002∗ -0.002
Age_sq 0.000 0.001 0.000
Married 0.003 0.001 0.002
Ch. Married 0.032∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.004
White 0.004 0.005 0.004
Unemp (%) -0.051 -0.024 -0.126∗∗
Ch. Unemp (%) -0.113 -0.016 0.354
Exper 0.005 0.007 -0.005
Exper_sq -0.001 -0.002 0.002
Ch. Metro 0.009 -0.030 0.017
Metro 0.000 -0.001 0.003
Disability -0.006 -0.005 -0.004
Ch. Disability 0.006 0.011 0.010
Year dummies 2.63∗∗∗ 1.00 9.10∗∗∗
(10 df) (9 df) (9 df)
Regional dummies 0.40 0.29 1.15
(3 df) (3 df) (3 df)
Ch. Regional dummies 0.63 0.18 0.76
(3 df) (3 df) (3 df)
Quarter dummies 5.25∗∗∗ 5.99∗∗∗ 12.58∗∗∗
(3 df) (3 df) (3 df)
Industry dummies 2.20∗∗ 0.80 0.98
(6 df) (6 df) (6 df)
Ch. Occupation dummies 6.22∗∗∗ 3.64∗∗∗ 3.83∗∗∗
(9 df) (9 df) (9 df)
Ch. Industry dummies 4.77∗∗∗ 5.33∗∗∗ 1.16
(6 df) (6 df) (6 df)
C1 -0.003 0.053 0.031
C2 0.062∗ 0.031 0.077
C3 0.978 -4.304 0.814
C4 -1.437 52.256∗ -4.767
Constant -0.005 0.001 0.050∗∗∗
Obs 64498 39613 41890
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. For region, year, quarter, indus-
try and occupation dummies we report the value of the χ2 statistics of joint
significance, and in parenthesis, the test constraints degrees of freedom.
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Table 4.13. High School
1983-1993 1994-2003 2004-2013
Standard deviations
σε 0.030 0.035 0.040
(0.004) (0.006) (0.008)
σi 0.071 0.070 0.043
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
σφ 0.260 0.262 0.225
(0.009) (0.009) (0.042)
Correlations
ρεpi 0.313 0.670 0.251
(0.164) (0.247) (0.197)
ρεµ -0.358 -1.000 0.013
(0.184) (0.125) (0.349)
ρξpi 0.104 0.046 -0.342
(0.069) (0.047) (0.325)
ρξpi−1 0.180 -0.030 -1.000
(0.171) (0.152) (0.422)
ρξµ 0.039 0.110 0.022
(0.016) (0.024) (0.041)
ρpipi−1 0.933 0.910 0.899
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
ρpiµ 0.496 0.394 0.141
(0.090) (0.130) (0.151)
ρpi−1µ 0.460 0.496 0.401
(0.102) (0.110) (0.135)
MA process
θ1 -0.455 -0.403 -0.441
(0.015) (0.031) (0.084)
θ2 -0.049 -0.016 -0.000
(0.017) (0.020) (0.032)
Notes: σε, σi , σφ are the standard deviations of the permanent
shock, transitory, and job respectively. Block bootstrap standard er-
rors in parentheses (100 repetitions). We constrain all the corre-
lation coefficients to lie between -1 and 1, and estimated θ to be
negative and above −1.
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Table 4.14. College Dropouts
1983-1993 1994-2003 2004-2013
Standard deviations
σε 0.042 0.047 0.052
(0.004) (0.007) (0.024)
σi 0.079 0.083 0.050
(0.002) (0.003) (0.021)
σφ 0.217 0.225 0.235
(0.030) (0.024) (0.058)
Correlations
ρεpi 0.078 0.805 0.378
(0.192) (0.229) (0.336)
ρεµ -0.714 -0.531 1.000
(0.167) (0.208) (0.481)
ρξpi -0.250 0.268 -0.441
(0.234) (0.192) (0.539)
ρξpi−1 0.439 0.243 -0.227
(0.512) (0.600) (0.414)
ρξµ 0.111 0.128 -0.138
(0.040) (0.038) (0.101)
ρpipi−1 0.926 0.901 0.907
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
ρpiµ 0.598 0.283 0.142
(0.152) (0.210) (0.200)
ρpi−1µ 0.688 0.521 -0.173
(0.142) (0.195) (0.206)
MA process
θ1 -0.433 -0.484 -0.400
(0.019) (0.031) (0.204)
θ2 -0.040 -0.086 -0.061
(0.021) (0.028) (0.149)
Notes: σε, σi , σφ are the standard deviations of the permanent
shock, transitory, and job respectively. Block bootstrap standard
errors in parentheses (100 repetitions). We constrain all the cor-
relation coefficients to lie between -1 and 1, and estimated θ
to be negative and above −1. For the period 2004-2013, we set
(ρεpi,ρεµ,ρξpi,ρξpi−1 ,ρpiµ) to the estimated correlations from pe-
riod 1994-2003 due to problems to capture selection for this par-
ticular case.
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Table 4.15. College Degree
1983-1993 1994-2003 2004-2013
Standard deviations
σε 0.050 0.048 0.058
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
σi 0.107 0.114 0.073
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
σφ 0.267 0.265 0.300
(0.009) (0.022) (0.029)
Correlations
ρεpi 0.495 0.864 0.679
(0.220) (0.187) (0.143)
ρεµ -0.582 -0.168 -0.847
(0.163) (0.171) (0.134)
ρξpi 0.004 0.057 -0.131
(0.040) (0.159) (0.192)
ρξpi−1 0.147 0.417 -0.953
(0.219) (0.234) (0.793)
ρξµ 0.091 0.081 0.132
(0.022) (0.025) (0.029)
ρpipi−1 0.935 0.889 0.919
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004)
ρpiµ 0.404 0.556 0.400
(0.126) (0.107) (0.223)
ρpi−1µ 0.419 0.722 0.480
(0.138) (0.110) (0.290)
MA process
θ1 -0.435 -0.444 -0.474
(0.016) (0.014) (0.032)
θ2 -0.047 -0.097 -0.090
(0.014) (0.012) (0.032)
Notes: σε, σi , σφ are the standard deviations of the permanent
shock, transitory, and job respectively. Block bootstrap standard er-
rors in parentheses (100 repetitions). We constrain all the corre-
lation coefficients to lie between -1 and 1, and estimated θ to be
negative and above −1.
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4.A.7 Calibration Table
Table 4.16. Calibration Targets
High School College dropouts College degree
Wealth to earnings ratio 12.98 16.03 14.38
Employment drop 45-61 % -25.49 -26.83 -30.79
Job finding % 16.48 17.52 18.25
Unemployment inflow % 2.15 1.45 0.09
Job to job % 2.82 2.78 2.30
Share wage decrease 43 43 42
Wage growth 25-50 % 35.10 54.94 74.52
Wage growth 51-61 % -3.07 -4.78 -5.87
Wage loss U % -11.84 -11.74 -15.58
Initial dispersion 0.38 0.38 0.41
Initial log wage 7.17 7.27 7.47
Note: The table displays the calibration targets using the SIPP data from our first period
of analysis: 1983-1993.Wealth to earnings ratio: median of the wealth to labor income ra-
tio. Employment drop 45-61: change in the participation rate at age 58-61 relative to age
45-47. Job finding: share of workers who are employed at the current quarter but where
not employed at the previous quarter. Unemployment inflow: share of workers who are not
employed at the current quarter but where employed at the previous quarter. Job to job:
share of workers who changed the firm which are working across consecutive quarters.
Share wage decrease: share of job to job transitions that implied a decrease in the hourly
wage.Wage growth 25-50: change in the average hourly wage at age 50 relative to age 25.
Wage growth 51-61: change in the average hourly wage at age 51 relative to age 61.Wage
loss U: average change in hourly wage when returning back to employment. Initial dis-
persion: dispersion of log wage not explained by job effects at the beginning of workers’
life (below 25 years old). Initial log wage: average wage at the beginning of workers’ life
(below 25 years old).
4.A.8 Can our Simulated Model Recover Back the Risk Components?
We would like to analyze whether our model is capable of reproducing the wage variance
components found empirically. To do so, we simulate our structural model with the risk pa-
rameters estimated for the 1980’s for 1,000 workers, and re-estimate the wage variance
components accounting for selection into mobility and participation.
Our identification of the selection into employment and across jobs hinged on the avail-
ability of exclusion restrictions which predict employment and mobility, but do result from
innovations to wages. Similar to the data, we solve the model under a high unemployment
benefit regime (bih = 1.4wih−1) and our baseline (bih = min

0.7wih−1, bmax
	
). Our model
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does not feature sufficient heterogeneity to replicate the exclusion restrictions used to iden-
tify mobility in the data. Our empirical results suggest that identification for mobility results
predominantly from time aggregation of workers moving away from a poor job prospect.
Therefore, to identify selection into mobility, we include different degrees of job destruction
rates (90%ω, ω, 110%ω) together with time aggregation. Similar to the data, we simulate
the model on a monthly basis and aggregate to a quarter.
Table 4.17 provides the resulting estimates of the wage variance components resulting
for the simulation of this model. For simplicity, we simulate the model without measurement
error. As in section 4.2.3, We estimate a nested trivariate probit as a function of a quadratic
in age, experience, state of unemployment benefits and job destruction rates. The latter two
variables are excluded from the wage growth equation.
Overall, we are able to recover the original estimated permanent and match component
for high school and college degree workers, while we somehow over-estimate the size of the
permanent shock at college dropouts. Also the selection terms implied by our model are sim-
ilar to the data. As in our empirical estimation, positive innovations to productivity increase
participation. Moreover, we obtain a negative correlation between shocks to productivity and
unobserved heterogeneity in mobility, which suggests that workers quit to non-employment
to search for a new job. Finally, we find that a good outside offer increases the propensity of
a worker to move jobs.
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Table 4.17.Wage Variance Components Based on Model Simulation
High School College dropout College degree
Standard deviations
σε 0.051 0.065 0.045
σφ 0.237 0.177 0.217
Correlations
ρεpi 0.642 0.891 0.333
ρεµ -1.000 -1.000 -1.000
ρξpi 0.023 -0.048 -0.184
ρξpi−1 -0.395 -0.280 0.331
ρξµ 0.207 0.307 0.186
ρpipi−1 0.962 0.963 0.962
ρpiµ 0.449 0.307 0.136
ρpi−1µ 0.306 0.261 0.057
Notes: σε, σφ are the standard deviations of the permanent shock and job
component shock respectively. We estimate the process based on a model sim-
ulation from the first period of analysis. We constrain all the correlation coef-
ficients to lie between -1 and 1.
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